China’s Fight for Tanzania

I. Introduction

In 1963, Julius Nyerere, the future president of Tanzania, stood on the White House lawn and told John F. Kennedy, “Every time I think of the United States, I think also of the freedom of my people.”¹ Only two years later, after expelling two American diplomats from Tanzania, Nyerere traveled to Beijing and returned with a new model for his country. Likening China’s leadership to America’s Founding Fathers, he proclaimed, “China's current leaders are revolutionary and have experiences that leaders of other countries do not have.”² Why the sudden change of heart?

An observer in 1959 would have found the prospect of Chinese influence in Tanzania improbable, if not fantastic. At that time, Tanzania did not yet exist. Tanganyika and Zanzibar remained under British rule, gaining independence in 1961 and 1963 respectively, before uniting in 1964. By 1959, both territories already had strong ties with other powers, leaving little room for a distant player like China.

Tanganyika had deep connections to the Western Bloc. A British territory until 1961 and a member of the Commonwealth thereafter, Tanganyika was governed by British civil servants who blocked Tanganyikans from contact with Communist countries. West Germany also exerted substantial influence in Tanganyika, considering it a foreign policy priority from independence onward.³ At the time of Tanganyika’s independence, Britain, West Germany, and the United States were its sole financial donors, while Israel trained its future military.⁴

Twenty-five miles off Tanganyika’s coast, another set of foreign powers took hold on the islands of Zanzibar. By the late 1950s, anti-colonial Egyptian radio flooded Zanzibari homes, and women carried handkerchiefs emblazoned with Egyptian President Nasser’s face. After gaining independence from Britain in 1963, Zanzibar’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed to be a personal friend of Nasser.⁵ Meanwhile, Israel vigorously supported the opposition party in Zanzibar. In the early 1960s, the Soviets and East Germans also began courting Zanzibar; by 1962, over a hundred and forty Zanzibari students – including the islands’ future prime minister – were studying in Eastern Bloc countries.⁶

Amidst this crowded landscape of foreign influence, China was virtually absent. In 1959, there were reportedly only two Chinese living in Tanzania’s future capital, Dar es Salaam: a carpenter and a restaurant owner.⁷ China also seemed to lack the resources to fight for influence in Africa. Per capita, China was significantly poorer than both Tanganyika and Zanzibar.⁸ Throughout the early 1960s, it struggled to keep up with its rivals’ spending; for every dollar China spent in Africa, the Soviet Union spent four, and the United States spent seventeen.⁹ However, China was not only poor; it was also internationally isolated.

China initially fought loyally alongside the Soviet Union in its Cold War struggle with the United States, but growing ideological tensions in the late 1950s drove a wedge between the two allies. The Sino-Soviet split became public when the Soviet Union withdrew all advisors from China in 1960. From that point forward, China fought the Cold War against both American imperialists and Soviet “revisionists.”

Decolonizing nations became a critical battleground for influence in China’s fight against the Americans and Soviets. After World War II, nearly one-third of the world’s population, mainly in Africa and Asia, gained independence. Determined to break free from the binary choice between Communism and capitalism, many emerging nations looked to one another for models of nationhood. This pursuit culminated in the Bandung Conference of 1955, which gave rise to the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.¹⁰ China fought to assert its leadership in the movement, positioning itself as a champion of anti-imperialism and contesting Soviet influence.

While the Soviets pursued “peaceful coexistence” with the United States and promoted socialism in the Third World, the Chinese took a more militant line in Africa. In February 1959, Mao told African leaders that “Africa’s mission is to oppose imperialism, not to oppose capitalism or establish socialism.”¹¹ Determined to position itself as the leading anti-imperialist power, China began supporting nationalist groups in Africa regardless of their ideologies, often arming different liberation movements than the Soviets.¹² This approach quickly led China to Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

Drawing on archival sources, newspapers, memoirs, and existing scholarship from across the globe, this essay explores how China became Tanzania’s partner of choice and how other powers lost their influence between 1959 and 1965. As China cautiously built ties with Tanganyika between 1961 and 1963, it gradually emerged as Nyerere’s preferred socialist partner over the Soviet Union (Chapter 1). Simultaneously, China grew its influence in Zanzibar between 1959 and 1963 by winning the heart of local revolutionary Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu (Chapter 2). Following the Zanzibar Revolution of January 1964, Cold War tensions in East Africa escalated, forcing Nyerere to confront Tanganyika’s vulnerability to subversion by the United States, the Soviet Union, and their proxies (Chapter 3). When Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form Tanzania in 1964, Nyerere’s sovereignty over his new country remained challenged by the Cold War and its regional conflicts, and China, respectful of Nyerere’s interests, became his most reliable partner (Chapter 4).

II. Looking for New Friends: Sino-Tanganyikan Relations from 1961-1963

Britain ruled Tanganyika as a League of Nations mandate since World War I. With a population of over nine million, the overwhelming majority of whom were native Africans, Tanganyika was swept up in the wave of nationalist movements spreading through the decolonizing world in the 1950s.¹³ In 1954, a schoolteacher named Julius Nyerere harnessed this rising sentiment by forming the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). TANU rapidly expanded through grassroots mobilization, alliances with local chiefs, and effective political campaigning. When Nyerere, a charismatic orator and advocate for non-racial nationalism, successfully pressured Britain to implement direct elections in 1958, TANU won every seat in the territory’s legislative council. By 1961, Britain agreed to independence negotiations, and on December 9, 1961, Tanganyika became independent. The following year, Nyerere won ninety-eight percent of the vote in the nation’s first presidential election.¹⁴

While few in the West paid attention to the Sino-Tanzanian relationship until after Tanganyika’s 1964 union with Zanzibar, the Chinese had been focusing on Tanganyika since the early 1960s.¹⁵ Tanganyika sought a relationship with China to assert an independent foreign policy and draw ideological inspiration. Meanwhile, China, eager to expand its influence in Africa, initiated a series of exchanges that accelerated rapprochement. Although China’s presence in Tanganyika was overshadowed by British, American, and West German influence in these early years, it successfully outmaneuvered the Soviet Union as the preferred socialist partner while competing indirectly with Israel for ideological influence.

Western Ties and Other Challenges

In the early 1960s, Tanganyika had close ties to the United States, West Germany, and Britain. As Tanganyika approached independence, Nyerere met with both the West German president and visited JFK at the White House.¹⁶ And once independent, Tanganyika’s government remained entrenched in British influence, with seventy-one percent of senior Tanganyikan civil servants being holdovers from British rule.¹⁷ When the Tanganyikan government launched a three-year development plan in 1961, it was funded exclusively by the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the United States, which together provided $53.7 million in loans.¹⁸ Given these deep financial ties, historian Jeremy Friedman sees the events of 1961 as a “strategic handover of control rather than a struggle for independence.”¹⁹

Prior to Tanganyika’s independence, Chinese influence in the country was negligible. American Gilbert Verbit, the legal adviser to Tanganyika’s Ministry of External Affairs in the early 1960s, recalls that Tanganyikan officials’ perceptions of China were overwhelmingly negative. At the time, the British colonial authorities prevented Tanganyikan officials from direct contact with the Chinese and portrayed China as a “yellow peril” seeking to “settle their surplus population.”²⁰

However, on Tanganyika’s independence day, December 9, 1961, Nyerere took the first step toward strengthening relations with China. At a press conference, he formally recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and not the Republic of China (Taiwan), as the legitimate government of China. In his address, he expressed his desire for “friendly relations between the two countries and their peoples in all aspects,” marking the beginning of a new phase in Sino-Tanganyikan relations.²¹

Nyerere’s recognition of the PRC was indicative of a larger shift away from the foreign policy of his Western partners.²² By independence, Nyerere had grown concerned with American and British policy in Africa, expressing disappointment with the American-backed assassination of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in January 1961 and over Britain’s failure to take decisive action against apartheid South Africa.²³ Wary of American and British capitalism and anti-Soviet intervention, Nyerere increasingly looked for ideological and foreign policy alternatives. While he would not publicly declare his commitment to “African socialism” until 1962, six months before independence he privately suggested that there were already elements of socialism in Tanganyika.²⁴ He believed that for Tanganyika – and Africa as a whole – to achieve meaningful independence, it had to forge its own ideas of nationhood. In foreign policy, this belief translated into a commitment to non-alignment. On independence day, Nyerere declared, “Our policy on international affairs will be determined by Tanganyika itself, which means that Tanganyika will be an independent Tanganyika.”²⁵ Recognizing the PRC and breaking with US-backed support for the Republic of China (Taiwan) was a tangible expression of this independent stance.

Nyerere also prioritized the liberation of other African states and, ultimately, African unity. This perspective may further explain his favorable view of the PRC, which had already demonstrated strong support for African liberation movements, beginning with its arming of the National Liberation Front in Algeria in 1958.²⁶

Tanganyika’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) immediately drew Beijing’s attention. Tanganyika’s independence received extensive media coverage in China, with China’s state newspaper, People’s Daily, publishing fourteen articles within a week.²⁷ Chinese diplomats also took notice, viewing Tanganyika’s recognition of China as strategically significant. At the time, Taiwan still held China’s seat in the United Nations. Securing recognition from newly independent African states had become central to Beijing’s campaign to reclaim its international legitimacy. Yet in the early 1960s, a majority of new African nations recognized Taiwan, not the PRC.²⁸ In this context, Tanganyika’s recognition stood out as a rare diplomatic victory – one that Chinese officials hoped would serve as a bridgehead for gaining recognition across East Africa.²⁹

Despite the goodwill generated by Nyerere’s recognition of the PRC, China’s early diplomatic efforts in Tanganyika faced significant challenges. Tanganyika limited foreign embassies to ten personnel, disadvantaging China, whose embassies were typically much larger. In contrast, Tanganyika permitted the British to maintain their better staffed embassy, reinforcing its stronger presence.³⁰ Adding to these difficulties, China had already made a foreign policy mistake that antagonized Nyerere. In January 1961, China hosted the leader of TANU’s opposition party, Zuberi Mtemvu of the African National Congress.³¹ Although China quickly adjusted its stance and supported TANU after independence, its early patronage of Mtemvu personally upset Nyerere.³²

Chinese hesitancy over Tanganyika’s political alignment also impeded early cooperation. A 1962 memo from China’s Foreign Affairs Office described TANU as representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie and labeled Nyerere as right-leaning. It also criticized Tanganyika’s foreign policy, condemning its “Western-oriented policy of peace and neutrality” and “dependence on and illusions about the West.” Despite these concerns, the memo acknowledged Tanganyika’s efforts at rapprochement as genuine, highlighting Nyerere’s interest in learning from China.³³

A Good First Impression

It was in this atmosphere of curious goodwill and cautious skepticism that the first significant contact between the TANU government and China took place. In September 1962, at China’s invitation, a three-person delegation led by Ali Mwinyi Tambwe, a member of TANU’s central committee, visited Beijing.³⁴ According to Tambwe, the delegation aimed to study China’s organizational, agricultural, and educational systems, explore the possibility of sending Tanganyikan students to China, and encourage China to support the Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar.³⁵ Tambwe was not a high enough ranking member of TANU’s central committee to sign agreements during the visit, suggesting that while Nyerere was interested in rapprochement with China, he was not yet ready for firm commitments or high-profile public engagement.³⁶

Several challenges arose during Tambwe’s three-week visit to China. Chief among them was China’s refusal to terminate its support for the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, a group that remained out of favor with TANU (see page 26). Additionally, when the Tanganyikan delegation requested to send students to China, claiming they had received invitations from the Soviet Union and Egypt, the Chinese declined and would only commit to training short-term interns.³⁷ Finally, during a meeting with the delegation, Zhou Enlai obliquely criticized Tanganyika’s ties with the United States, warning Tambwe of the subversive potential of the Peace Corps. Tambwe reassured Zhou that his government had the situation under control.³⁸

Despite these challenges, the meeting ultimately strengthened the ties between the two countries. Firstly, the visit resolved concerns over China’s past support for Tanganyikan opposition leader Mtemvu. When Tambwe raised the issue with Vice Premier Chen Yi, Chen assured him that China’s support for Mtemvu ended with TANU’s electoral victory and Tanganyika’s independence. Emphasizing China’s policy of non-interference, Chen told Tambwe, “If we have diplomatic relations with the government and support the opposition party, it would be considered subversion.”³⁹

Secondly, the delegation was receptive to China’s stance on development. Zhou Enlai emphasized that, unlike Western assistance, Chinese aid came without conditions. He also underscored the importance of Tanganyika achieving economic self-reliance, a concept Nyerere was just beginning to articulate. Although substantial Chinese aid had yet to materialize, the Tanganyikan delegation embraced Zhou’s arguments on ideological grounds, affirming that “the nature of socialist countries is not to provide aid with any conditions” and that “the Chinese path to economic development is correct.”⁴⁰

Finally, the Tanganyikan delegation was personally impressed by China's hospitality. Chinese officials stressed the importance of a grand reception, which reportedly pleased the visitors. During their stay, the delegation interacted with senior Chinese leaders, including Chen Yi and Zhou Enlai. Notably, Tambwe requested medical treatment for his prostate cancer during the visit, explaining that although he could have sought care from the Soviets, in his words, “China took better care of Africans.”⁴¹

First Official Ties

Two months later, Sino-Tanganyikan relations advanced with a Chinese delegation’s return visit to Dar es Salaam. The delegation was warmly received by high-level Tanganyikan officials, including Nyerere himself.⁴² After touring Tanganyika, the delegation signed a cultural cooperation agreement outlining sports, art, and performance exchanges, as well as vague provisions regarding education and technical collaboration in radio, news, and film. Tanganyika’s legal advisor recalled that negotiations were congenial and resembled agreements commonly made by developing nations eager to accelerate diplomatic relations.⁴³

Following this agreement, China began prioritizing its relationship with Tanganyika. The head of the Chinese delegation sent a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claiming that the agreement was “very influential” as it was Tanganyika’s first formal agreement with a foreign country and an “obvious reflection” of its desire for closer relations with China. The telegram also pointed out that China now had the chance to pull ahead of competition in Tanganyika, claiming, “After the signing of the cultural agreement, the white people were generally surprised, and the Soviet Union was a little jealous.”⁴⁴ After the cultural delegation visited four other African nations, they compiled a report which stated that prospects for influence were most promising in Tanganyika and Somalia and recommended that those two nations “be given priority.” At the time, China was losing ground to the USSR and the US in other African nations, including Egypt, Algeria, Guinea, and Ghana. Hence, the report urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to swiftly capitalize on China’s position in Tanganyika.⁴⁵

Sino-Soviet Competition in Tanganyika

Like China, the Soviet Union tried to build ties with Tanganyika in the early 1960s. Before independence, Tanganyikans had already contacted the USSR about study opportunities.⁴⁶ And, five months before Tanganyika’s independence, Nyerere met a Soviet representative in England, expressing openness to relations but making no firm commitments.⁴⁷ Following independence, Nyerere sent a letter to Khrushchev welcoming cultural and trade relations.⁴⁸ And, at the invitation of the Soviets, Tambwe’s delegation visited Moscow after their stay in China.⁴⁹

However, Nyerere feared Soviet subversion, which ultimately hindered the two countries' relationship. Nyerere suspected that a political rival from the African National Congress, Christopher Tumbo, was receiving payments from the Soviets and trying to exploit labor unions for political ends. While he was also wary of Chinese support for political rival Mtemvu, Nyerere considered Tumbo – and his concomitant Soviet influence – a greater threat.⁵⁰ Ultimately, Nyerere passed a law to detain Tumbo without due process in the name of protecting his government from subversion.⁵¹

By the time the Moshi Conference convened in February 1963, China had emerged as Tanganyika’s preferred non-Western partner. The event, the third meeting of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), was held in Moshi, Tanganyika. Even before the event began, Tanganyika signaled its alignment with China’s stance against the USSR by refusing to invite observers from Eastern European countries.⁵² Recognizing the significance of the meeting, China sent a sizable twenty-four-person delegation more than a week in advance.⁵³ The Chinese representatives were so confident in their influence over both the AAPSO and Tanganyika that they bluntly told a Soviet representative, “Why did you come? There is nothing for you to do here.”⁵⁴ During the conference, China openly criticized the USSR for its weak approach in confronting imperialism and promoted its own militant approach to African liberation, which resonated with many African leaders.⁵⁵ By the end of the conference, Chinese delegates claimed victory, having successfully dominated much of the proceedings.⁵⁶

Following the Moshi Conference, Sino-Tanganyikan relations deepened. In September 1963, Mao Zedong introduced his theory of two intermediate zones, stating, “There are two intermediate zones: the first, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the second, Europe, Japan, and Canada.”⁵⁷ Mao believed these regions were dissatisfied with both the USSR and the US, leading China to intensify its diplomatic focus on Africa.⁵⁸ A month later, a Tanganyikan delegation visited Beijing, explicitly seeking Chinese aid and insights into its development model. The delegation was eager to learn about China’s commune organization, reflecting its growing ideological influence as Nyerere refined his Ujamaa and villagization policies, first introduced in late 1962.⁵⁹ Ujamaa – Swahili for “familyhood” – was a vision for African socialism emphasizing collective agriculture and self-reliance, while villagization involved resettling rural populations into communal villages reminiscent of Mao’s communes. The Tanganyikan delegation was also interested in the Sino-Soviet split, requesting China’s perspective and expressing frustration with the Soviet ambassador in Tanganyika, who had questioned their visit to Beijing.⁶⁰

Reasons for Early Success

Political challenges within Tanganyika pushed Nyerere closer to China. While Nyerere championed non-racialism as essential to building a multi-ethnic state, racial tensions in Tanganyika escalated in the early 1960s. In early 1962, racialist factions within TANU began compiling lists of whites and Indians to expel from the country.⁶¹ Under pressure from racialist rivals, Nyerere briefly stepped down but returned to power after winning the presidential election in late 1962. During his absence, TANU leaders accelerated Africanization, replacing white and Indian civil servants with Africans.⁶² Upon returning to power, Nyerere was forced to adjust to a more racially charged political climate.

Tanganyika’s increasingly racialized politics fostered closer ties with China through mutual animosity towards India.⁶³ Tanganyika was home to approximately 90,000 Indians. Due to their preferential employment in civil service under British rule, Indians generally enjoyed high socio-economic status, which fueled resentment among African Tanganyikans. Tanganyika’s legal advisor observed that this hostility extended to India itself.⁶⁴ In October 1962, as TANU and China established early contact, the Sino-Indian border conflict erupted. Tanganyika notably proposed resolutions with terms more favorable to China than those put forward by other African nations.⁶⁵ Tanganyika’s pro-Chinese posturing likely reflected underlying racial animosities. During a June 1963 visit to Shanghai by a Tanganyikan labor union, after their Chinese hosts verbally attacked Indian aggression, the Tanganyikan representatives agreed that “Indians are indeed very bad.”⁶⁶

Racial undertones among Chinese and Tanganyikan officials may have also worked against the Soviets. In matters of Afro-Asian solidarity, the USSR aligned itself with both India and Egypt, a position likely unpopular among TANU’s racialist wing, which expressed animosity towards both Indians and Arabs.⁶⁷ Chinese officials also consistently emphasized the whiteness of the Soviets, grouping them in with Tanganyika’s former colonizers, and openly questioned whether Russians were fit to participate in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.⁶⁸ As TANU’s racialist wing sought to reduce dependence on white powers, aligning too closely with the white Soviet leadership could have been politically damaging for Nyerere.

Israeli Inspiration

In Tanganyika’s early years, China also faced indirect competition from Israel for influence. Israel was engaged in a competition with Egypt that would become one of the Cold War’s most intense regional conflicts.⁶⁹ Seeking to counter Egyptian influence in Black Africa, Israel funded and trained many newly independent African governments. In 1959, a TANU Youth League delegation led by Nyerere’s brother traveled to Israel and secured an agreement for Israeli assistance in establishing Tanganyika’s National Service.⁷⁰ Modeled after Israel’s Nahal system, which combined military and agricultural training to develop collective farm settlements (kibbutzim), the National Service established teams of militarized farmers to promote self-reliance and nation-building.⁷¹ Eventually, the National Service would become the backbone of Tanganyika’s military, and Israel’s Nahal model, like China’s commune system, helped inspire Ujamaa and villagization.⁷² Israeli aid also served as a vehicle for American influence in Tanganyika. Believing that Israeli training was more effective than direct American involvement, the CIA secretly funded the initiative.⁷³

III. Making Fast Friends: Sino-Zanzibari Relations from 1959-1963

Some twenty-five miles off the shores of Tanganyika lie the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, together known as Zanzibar. Though tiny – just a quarter of a percent of Tanganyika’s landmass – Zanzibar was a key trade hub in East Africa. Following centuries of Arab rule, Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890 under the constitutional monarchy of Sultan Abdullah bin Khalifa.

As Zanzibar approached independence, it developed a racially charged politics.⁷⁴ By the mid-twentieth century, the islands’ population of three hundred thousand was roughly 76% African, 17% Arab, and 6% South Asian.⁷⁵ Zanzibar’s economy revolved around clove production, and socio-economic roles loosely followed racial lines: Arabs controlled land ownership, Africans worked as growers, and South Asians dominated trade. When the British held direct elections on the islands in 1957, Arab Zanzibaris, led by a cosmopolitan intelligentsia, were already politically organized, having formed the Zanzibar National Party in 1954. The party advocated for non-racial, anti-colonial nationalism under the Sultanate. However, poorer African Zanzibaris, dissatisfied with Arab dominance, established the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in 1957 to challenge the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP).⁷⁶ This created a political landscape primarily split along racial lines, with the Arab ZNP and the African ASP as the two major parties. Despite having an electoral minority, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party dominated elections through 1964.

As the British withdrew from Zanzibar, China successfully established a foothold on the islands. It did so mainly through one man, Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu. Through his newspaper, Zanews, Babu became a key instrument of Chinese propaganda, and through his political acumen, he unified and mobilized Zanzibar’s progressive forces. However, to gain influence, China had to overcome intense competition, outmaneuvering the islands’ factions backed by Egypt and Tanganyika and pre-empting attempts by the Soviet Union and its allies.

Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu

Babu, a Zanzibari politician of mixed Arab and African descent, championed a vision of non-racial nationalism. In the 1950s, Babu studied in London, where he engaged with Communists from around the world, including Soviet and Chinese figures. Upon returning to Zanzibar in 1957, he took on leadership roles within the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, its newspaper, and its left-wing youth wing, Youth’s Own Union (YOU). Leveraging his international connections, Babu expanded the ZNP’s global reach, bringing a delegation to Prague in 1958 and establishing party offices in Cairo, London, and Havana over the next three years.⁷⁷

Babu’s search for international support for the ZNP ultimately led him to China. Likely having established Chinese contact while in London, in 1959, Babu and his associate Ali Sultan Issa – the head of the ZNP-affiliated labor union – reached out to the Chinese embassy in Egypt and requested visits to China, scholarships for Zanzibari students, and funds for a printing press. Recognizing Babu’s political influence in Zanzibar, the embassy alerted China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which approved Babu and Issa’s requests.⁷⁸ In late 1959, Babu visited China and was deeply impressed. Later, reflecting on this visit, Babu wrote, “The meetings with the Chinese leadership and the late-night discussions with them [...] were most inspiring and helped mold my world outlook.”⁷⁹

“The meetings with the Chinese leadership and the late-night discussions with them […] were most inspiring and helped mold my world outlook.”

— Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, on his 1959 visit to China

Babu’s visit sparked increased Chinese interest in Zanzibar and paved the way for a series of visits by ZNP leaders to China. In late 1959, the People’s Daily began extensive coverage of Zanzibar, reporting that continued throughout the 1960s.⁸⁰ Just three months after Babu’s visit, fellow ZNP leader Ali Sultan Issa led a delegation from his labor union to Beijing.⁸¹ In late 1960, China hosted a month-long tour for a YOU delegation, followed shortly by another month-long visit by a group of ZNP officials led by the party’s vice-chairman.⁸² By 1963, China was training Babu’s followers in guerrilla warfare tactics.⁸³

Visiting Zanzibaris became convinced that China was the Communist partner of choice. Against the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet split, China positioned itself as the superior model for Zanzibar’s revolutionary path. Babu, who also had ties to the Soviets, was among the first to embrace China’s approach. Issa, who also had Soviet ties, was similarly swayed. Reflecting on his 1960 visit, Issa admitted, “I had not been as impressed by the greatness of the Russians as I was with the Chinese. […] When I returned to Zanzibar, I was in complete agreement with Babu about China, that this was the ideological line to follow.”⁸⁴ These visits had a similar impact on rank and file members of the ZNP; one trade unionist remarked that his single month in China in 1960 left a greater impression on him than ten months in East Germany.⁸⁵ What it was about China that swayed Zanzibaris is elusive, though most accounts emphasize face time with Chinese leadership and China’s hospitality.⁸⁶

“I had not been as impressed by the greatness of the Russians as I was with the Chinese. […] When I returned to Zanzibar, I was in complete agreement with Babu about China, that this was the ideological line to follow.”

— Ali Sultan Issa, reflecting on his 1960 visit to China

Zanews

In an attempt to shape public opinion, China leveraged its budding connections with Zanzibari elites through the press and radio. Early elections in Zanzibar ushered in an era of mass politics, with newspapers playing a central role.⁸⁷ Like Zanzibar’s political landscape, its newspapers were divided along racial lines.⁸⁸ In 1961, when Babu opened his own newspaper, Zanews, it became the first paper on the islands that did not cater to a specific racial group. The Chinese financed the paper, providing Babu printing materials and $20,000 a month.⁸⁹

Zanews garnered broad-based support for both Babu and China through its widespread circulation and non-racial politics. Its reach was so extensive that the British Colonial Office described Zanzibar as being “flooded with literature emanating from Communist China.”⁹⁰ Unlike other Zanzibari newspapers, Zanews avoided domestic racial politics. Instead, it focused on international anti-imperial struggles, which helped it attract a diverse left-wing readership. Many of its stories came directly from the English-language wing of China’s Xinhua news agency. Promoting Afro-Asian solidarity, Zanews reported on Sino-African exchanges and Chinese aid to Africa and analogized Western intervention in Africa to American aggression towards China.⁹¹

“Zanzibar [is] flooded with literature emanating from Communist China.”

— The British Colonial Office, on the reach of Babu’s Zanews

Zanews’s propaganda succeeded because it avoided alienating potential supporters. The paper remained silent on Soviet “revisionism,” a sensitive issue given some Zanzibaris’ Soviet connections, and refrained from commenting on Zanzibar’s domestic politics. An internal 1963 Chinese report on East Africa reveals China’s rationale: “On the issue of anti-revisionism, we should focus on exposing it from the perspective of [...] opposing great power chauvinism.”⁹² In Maoist jargon, “opposing great power chauvinism” meant highlighting Soviet and American subversion.⁹³ The Chinese report also recommended against “any content that criticizes the government, interferes in internal affairs, supports the opposition party,” so China would not be implicated in the subversion it attacked.⁹⁴

Tanganyikan Influence in Zanzibar

Nyerere’s ruling party, TANU, supported the Afro-Shirazi Party, viewing it as the only hope of an African-led Zanzibari government. By extension, TANU renounced the dominance of Babu’s Arab-majority ZNP. As early as 1958, ASP leader Abeid Amani Karume began cultivating ties in Dar es Salaam, and in the following years, TANU provided the ASP with financial support.⁹⁵ China’s continued support for the ZNP, the ASP’s rival party, risked alienating Tanganyika.

During TANU leader Tambwe’s 1962 visit to China (see page 11), tensions between Tanganyikan support for the ASP and Chinese support for the ZNP forced China to reconsider its approach. In a meeting with Premier Chen Yi, Tambwe conveyed TANU’s frustration: The [Arab ZNP] is a group of feudal lords [...] [Zanzibar’s] 200,000 Africans are uneducated, and [ASP] party leaders cannot come to China to explain their positions.

Chen Yi avoided committing to support the ASP, but also pushed back against Tambwe’s skepticism of the ZNP Arabs, responding, “Not all [Zanzibari Arabs] are feudal lords and exploiters.” Despite Chen Yi’s reluctance, Tambwe pressed on, making for an increasingly uncomfortable meeting. Seeking to move the discussion forward, Chen Yi stated, “We do not want the issue of Zanzibar Island to affect China-Tanganyika relations.” Tambwe, however, closed with a straightforward proposition: “If the progressive elements among the Arabs join African organizations, the problem will be solved.” In response, Chen Yi promised to raise the matter with ZNP leaders.⁹⁶

Tambwe’s proposal materialized when Babu founded the Umma Party, which united progressives from the ZNP and ASP. It seems Tanganyikan pressure on China played a role in this development. Just two months after Tambwe’s visit, China hosted the first of several visits by ASP members.⁹⁷ The following year, Zanews sent a telegram to Xinhua’s London office with the following message: “Babu declared that the [ZNP] from which he recently resigned is no longer a revolutionary movement [...] Progressive elements have resigned from the ZNP and joined the new UMMA Party.”⁹⁸

Following its formation, both China and Tanganyika backed the Umma Party. China and TANU provided financial assistance, with TANU reportedly believing this support could contribute to the downfall of the ZNP government.⁹⁹ However, despite this outward show of support, China continued to hedge its bets. After the ZNP defeated both the ASP and the Umma party in the July 1963 elections, the Chinese Ambassador to Egypt met with the new Zanzibari leadership in Cairo.¹⁰⁰ Simultaneously, China began funding an ASP newspaper.¹⁰¹

Egyptian Influence in Zanzibar

Egypt, then known as the United Arab Republic (UAR), was another major source of influence in Zanzibar.¹⁰² President Gamal Nasser, a staunch pan-Arabist, sought to bridge the Arab and African worlds. Throughout the late 1950s, Egypt co-opted Zanzibari Arab elites to broadcast Sauti ya Cairo, a ZNP-friendly radio station. With an early monopoly on Zanzibar’s radio audience, Sauti ya Cairo became a crucial tool for advancing Nasser’s vision and fueling anti-colonial sentiment.¹⁰³ By the late 1950s, Nasser proposed integrating Zanzibar into the Greater Arab Union, and the Zanzibar Nationalist Party established its first overseas office in Cairo.¹⁰⁴ After the ZNP’s victory July 1963 electoral victory, the new ZNP leadership traveled to Cairo to meet with Nasser and negotiate Egyptian aid.¹⁰⁵ Large-scale Egyptian assistance to Zanzibar may have materialized had the ZNP government not been overthrown months later.

Egyptian influence in the ZNP provoked antagonism from TANU. Because TANU supported black rule in Zanzibar, it pressured Egypt to stop funding the Arab ZNP. On Tambwe’s 1962 visit to China, he told Chen Yi, “If the North African countries support the East African Arabs, they will become our enemies.”¹⁰⁶ The Afro-Shirazi Party viewed TANU as a check against Egyptian support of the ZNP. In October 1963, ASP leader Karume assured supporters that if the ZNP asked Egypt to send soldiers to Zanzibar, the ASP would respond by requesting African soldiers from Tanganyika.¹⁰⁷

Israel, TANU’s patron, also tried to counter Egyptian influence. By 1963, Israeli businessman Misbah Feinsilber – reportedly a card-carrying ASP member – facilitated training for the ASP-affiliated labor union.¹⁰⁸ Following the formation of the Umma party, Israel also began supporting Zanzibari progressives, viewing them as another means to dislodge ZNP and Egyptian influence.¹⁰⁹ This geopolitical struggle played out in Zanzibar’s press. The ZNP’s Mwongozi stoked fears of Israeli influence while downplaying TANU’s concerns over Egyptian involvement.¹¹⁰

China’s deteriorating ties with Egypt allowed it to compete directly with the UAR for influence in Zanzibar. After a 1963 visit to Egypt, a report by the Chinese cultural delegation dismissed Nasser’s “so-called Arab socialism” and claimed relations had soured since “Nasser moved to the right.” The report also expressed frustration with the UAR’s “ambitions to expand or infiltrate other Arab and African countries” like Zanzibar.¹¹¹ As tensions grew, China challenged Egypt’s radio dominance in East Africa by launching Radio Peking, first in English in 1959, then in Swahili in 1961, employing ZNP members trained in China to run the station.¹¹²

Egypt actively resisted China’s efforts in Zanzibar. In 1960, the UAR attempted to block a Zanzibari delegation from flying to China through Cairo. Once the ZNP delegation made it to Beijing, they criticized Nasser’s regime and accused Sauti ya Cairo of “stirring up discord among East African countries.”¹¹³

The rivalry between Egypt and China in Zanzibar reflected their broader competition for leadership in the Afro-Asian Solidarity movement. By 1960, when the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization met in Conakry, China believed Egypt and India were steering Afro-Asian solidarity toward neutrality.¹¹⁴ While both Egypt and China promoted anti-imperialist rhetoric, their ideological visions clashed: Mao backed militant Communism, while Nasser championed Arab nationalism.¹¹⁵ Following the Sino-Indian border conflict, at the 1963 Moshi Conference, Egypt sided with India in its attempt to condemn Chinese aggression.¹¹⁶ This rivalry also played out in the Zanzibari press, with the Chinese-backed Zanews defending China’s position by citing Afro-Asian sources that claimed India refused to negotiate.¹¹⁷

Soviet Influence in Zanzibar

The Soviet Union was a latecomer to the competition for influence in Zanzibar, launching its efforts after Egypt, Israel, Tanganyika, and China had already gained a foothold. Like China, the USSR hedged its bets, supporting both the ASP and ZNP. While the Soviet Union received requests from both parties as early as 1960, it did not provide direct aid until 1962, when it granted five hundred rubles to the ASP for a typewriter.¹¹⁸ Later that year, the USSR invited a ZNP leader to visit Russia “to clarify the essence of the disagreements between the ZNP and ASP.”¹¹⁹ Unlike China, the Soviets concentrated their efforts on educating Zanzibar’s future leaders. ASP leader Abdullah Kassim Hanga studied at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, and, by 1964, fifty-eight Zanzibari students were studying in the USSR.¹²⁰ Soviet interest in Zanzibar increased significantly in 1963. That year, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs compiled a detailed report on the islands, and the Soviet Union and its proxies, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary, provided training and visits for the ASP, ZNP labor unions, and the Umma Party.¹²¹

Even as Soviet interest in Zanzibar grew, the Russians failed to keep up with the constantly changing political situation. While Chinese propaganda was effectively localized through Babu’s Zanews, Soviet efforts remained generic, consisting primarily of English translations of publications like Soviet Woman and Moscow News.¹²² Because Soviet authorities primarily focused on Zanzibar’s Marxist-Leninist elements, Zanzibaris sensed the USSR was more concerned with supporting Communism than nationalism. For example, the ASP newspaper Africa Kwetu criticized the Soviets for supporting nationalism only when it served as “a project to undermine the West.”¹²³ Key leftist ZNP leaders like Babu and Issa had already chosen China as their preferred sponsor by 1960. In contrast to the attention Zanzibar received from China’s top leaders, Soviet discussions concerning Zanzibar rarely advanced beyond mid-level bureaucrats. The Soviets’ cold reception of Zanzibaris may have reflected a broader Soviet foreign policy trend, as former Soviet advisors claim that leadership was principally concerned with policy in the US, Europe, and China and uninterested in issues pertaining to the rest of the world.¹²⁴

Even before the Soviets and Americans turned their full attention to Zanzibar, the Cold War’s peripheral conflicts had already taken root on the islands. The Israeli-Egyptian rivalry, the clash between Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism, and the budding Sino-Soviet split all played out in Zanzibar, while the retreating British watched uneasily. Having successfully distributed its propaganda through Zanews and having won the hearts of many Zanzibari progressives, China had a firm foothold in Zanzibar by 1963. But China would have to adjust its approach when revolution broke out in Zanzibar in 1964.

IV. The Zanzibar Revolution Brings Cold War Intrigue to East Africa

In December 1963, Zanzibar gained full independence from Britain and remained a constitutional monarchy under Sultan Abdullah bin Khalifa. Having won the most recent set of elections, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party ruled the islands’ newly independent government.¹²⁵ But this government would only last a month. On January 12, 1964, in a sudden and violent upheaval, the Zanzibar Revolution toppled the ZNP-led monarchy overnight, replacing it with the People's Republic of Zanzibar. The collapse of the Arab government sent shockwaves and confusion through the world and turned Zanzibar and its neighbor, Tanganyika, into a focal point of Cold War tensions. The Western bloc, fearing a Communist takeover, isolated the revolutionary regime, while the Soviet Union and its allies rushed to establish ties with the new leadership. For China, the revolution marked both an opportunity and a challenge: China could build on its existing relationships with Zanzibari elites, but it faced heightened socialist competition from the USSR and East Germany. As external powers scrambled to assert influence over Zanzibar, Nyerere became increasingly wary of being forced into alignment with either the Western bloc or the Soviet Union, preferring instead to chart an independent path for Tanganyika.

On the night of January 12, 1964, Afro-Shirazi Party Youth League member John Okello led an armed uprising, beginning with a raid on the Ziwani police armory just west of Zanzibar’s capital.¹²⁶ Seizing weapons, Okello and his followers toppled the ZNP government within hours. Okello declared himself “Field Marshal” of the People’s Republic of Zanzibar and, over the next several days, used Zanzibar’s radio stations as a platform for fiery speeches that portrayed himself as the architect of the revolution.¹²⁷ In the days following the uprising, widespread violence erupted against Zanzibari Arabs, with several thousand killed and many more forced into exile.¹²⁸

Babu and the Zanzibar Revolution

While neither Babu nor his socialist Umma Party orchestrated the Zanzibar Revolution, it allowed Babu to maneuver himself into power amid the post-revolutionary chaos. Babu considered Okello “the arch-lumpen,” and Babu’s supporters even weighed assassinating Okello.¹²⁹ Yet, Babu also recognized the opportunity to co-opt the revolution, to transform it from “a narrow, lumpen, anti-Arab, anti-privilege, anti-this and anti-that perspective into a serious social revolution.”¹³⁰ To strengthen Babu’s position, roughly 200 armed Umma Party members – some of whom received military training in China – joined the uprising.¹³¹ Over the next two months, Babu, along with ASP leaders Abdullah Hanga and Abeid Karume, pushed Okello out of power. Nyerere backed the ASP with a three-hundred-man Tanganyikan police force, which allowed Hanga and Karume to gain more power than Babu. Karume became President of the new government, Hanga became Prime Minister, and Babu was appointed Minister of External Affairs, positioning him as Zanzibar’s paramount diplomat.¹³²

The West Responds with Antagonism

The new Zanzibari government was not firmly committed to Communism. While there were signs of a leftward shift – Babu had close ties to China, and Hanga had studied in the USSR – the ASP’s primary goal was overthrowing Arab rule, not implementing Communist ideology.¹³³ Throughout 1963, the ASP newspaper Africa Kwetu ran polemics against both the USSR and China while maintaining a friendly tone toward the US.¹³⁴

However, the US and UK misinterpreted the Zanzibar Revolution as a Communist coup, which fueled suspicion and hostility toward Zanzibar’s new government. American and British intelligence agencies – along with media outlets that had long warned of Zanzibar becoming an “African Cuba” – mistakenly attributed the uprising to Babu and his Umma Party. This intelligence failure stemmed from a lack of American and British intelligence staff focused on Zanzibar before the revolution and was likely compounded by Cold War anxieties, as the US and UK viewed any new Communist state as a direct threat to the global balance of power.¹³⁵

The day after the revolution, a US State Department memo titled “The Communist Specter Looms in Zanzibar” claimed “the prime movers of the revolution were Babu’s followers.”¹³⁶ The next day, the New York Times ran an article entitled “A Cuba Off Africa?”, which warned that Zanzibar could become a “manageable base for [Communist] subversion in all East Africa.”¹³⁷ The Yale Daily News even claimed, “Zanzibar has become the cauldron of the three witches in Macbeth, and all three of the witches are Communist.”¹³⁸

“Zanzibar has become the cauldron of the three witches in Macbeth, and all three of the witches are Communist.”

— The Yale Daily News, January 1964

The Western response quickly escalated beyond rhetoric. On January 13, just one day after the Zanzibar revolution, Britain deployed a Royal Navy ship to the region, while the U.S. considered military action through February.¹³⁹ While these powers ultimately did not intervene, their reaction to the revolution had turned Zanzibar into a Cold War flashpoint.

Contrary to British and American fears, the new Zanzibari leadership hoped for some rapprochement with the West. Even Babu, the most ideologically driven leader, acknowledged that Zanzibar’s clove export economy depended on trade with both Western and socialist countries. Don Petterson, an American consul in Zanzibar, later described his first post-revolution meeting with Babu as pleasant. Babu assured him that Zanzibar “wanted the friendship of the US government” and had “no interest in Cold War propaganda or activity.”¹⁴⁰ In the month following the revolution, Zanzibari newspapers maintained a neutral stance on the Cold War, openly criticizing both sides.¹⁴¹

However, the West’s hostility toward the revolutionary government pushed Zanzibar further toward Communist influence. Karume and other leaders took personal offense at the US and UK’s refusal to recognize the new government as well as the harsh criticism of the revolution in Western media.¹⁴² Frustrated by the diplomatic snub, Karume expelled US diplomats on February 23, 1964, stating, “It has been more than a month and a half now, but Britain and America have not recognized our government.”¹⁴³ In response, the US and Britain quickly recognized the government, though relations remained strained. On April 7, Karume escalated his defiance by ordering the removal of a NASA tracking station on Zanzibar, a move aligned with Communist claims that it was a vestige of imperialism.¹⁴⁴

The Soviet Union and East Germany Respond with Vigor

Just as the Zanzibar Revolution drew Western attention, it also sparked interest from the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet Union acted quickly, with Khrushchev personally recognizing the new government on January 18.¹⁴⁵ A week later, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement celebrating the revolution as an anti-colonial victory and condemning potential British and US intervention.¹⁴⁶

The revolution also fueled Soviet ambitions to increase its footprint in Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Within days of the uprising, the Soviet Committee of Solidarity of Asian and African Countries met with Dennis Phombeah, a pro-Soviet leader from TANU, Tanganyika’s ruling party. Phombeah was “very upset by the fact that the Chinese embassy [in Tanganyika was] far more active than [the Soviets’],” and urged the USSR to increase its embassy staff and push Nyerere to visit Moscow.¹⁴⁷ The Soviets also quickly escalated their involvement in Zanzibar, becoming the first country to send military advisors in March.¹⁴⁸

However, East German aid soon eclipsed Soviet assistance, partly because Zanzibar believed that relations with the USSR – as with the US – carried the risk of subversion. Babu later recalled that, as Zanzibar’s Foreign Minister, he had to “resist both the CIA and KGB respective enticements.”¹⁴⁹ Seeking less polarizing socialist support, Zanzibar turned to East Germany.

Field Marshal Okello sent a letter asking East Germany to recognize the new Zanzibari government on January 13, just one day after the revolution.¹⁵⁰ Shortly thereafter, Okello recognized East Germany. Markus Wolf, head of East Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, who arrived in Zanzibar in February, later described the unexpected diplomatic opening: “The new country forced itself on our attention by suddenly offering diplomatic recognition to East Germany [...] Zanzibar chose us; we did not choose them.” Wolf explained that Zanzibar’s decision was “based on a simple political calculation: because the East African Union countries depended economically on traditional trade and financial ties with Britain, an outright link with one of the two Communist powers [presumably China and the Soviet Union] would have been unwise.”¹⁵¹ In the months following the revolution, East Germany outpaced both the Soviet Union and China in Zanzibar, providing the majority of material for the islands’ radio broadcasts and agreeing to build fifty blocks of apartments.¹⁵²

“The new country forced itself on our attention by suddenly offering diplomatic recognition to East Germany […] Zanzibar chose us; we did not choose them.”

— Markus Wolf, head of East German foreign intelligence

China Responds with Caution

While the revolution triggered a flurry of activity from both the Soviet and Western blocs, China responded more cautiously. Like the USSR, China recognized the new Zanzibar government on January 18. But, unlike the Soviets, Chinese state media justified its recognition by emphasizing that other African governments had already recognized Zanzibar, framing its support within regional nationalism rather than ideological expansion.¹⁵³ Three days before China’s official recognition, Babu called He Ying, the Chinese ambassador to Tanganyika, and requested a state visit. However, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised against immediate recognition or a visit.¹⁵⁴ Beijing likely wanted to gauge how other East African countries would react before committing to a diplomatic line. Strategically, this approach would allow China to position itself as a supporter of African unity and liberation and avoid accusations of Communist subversion. China’s caution extended beyond diplomatic recognition. While the Soviets quickly sent military advisors to Zanzibar, China waited another month or two before deploying its own military personnel.¹⁵⁵

China’s caution was indicative of its developing policy in Africa. Just three days after the Zanzibar revolution, while on a trip to Ghana, Zhou Enlai announced China’s new principles for foreign aid.¹⁵⁶ China’s “Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance” codified a policy that did not attach conditions to aid, upheld equality between locals and Chinese technicians, and respected the sovereignty of the nation receiving China’s aid.¹⁵⁷

Rather than abruptly expanding its presence in Zanzibar, China strengthened its influence through Babu. As he consolidated power, Babu and his followers took control of the previously fragmented media landscape. With ZNP intellectuals fleeing the islands, the Chinese worked with Babu to train Zanzibar’s new class of journalists in China.¹⁵⁸ A month after the revolution, Zanzibari newspapers began publishing articles that echoed Chinese state media. A February article in The Zanzibar Voice, for example, traced Zanzibar’s connections to China from the Tang Dynasty to the present.¹⁵⁹ In Babu’s own words, he also “liberated” the radio from Okello, transforming it into the “leading organ of public education.”¹⁶⁰ Babu’s radio speeches hailed China as a model for Zanzibar’s development. Acting on Chinese inspiration, Zanzibar nationalized all land in March.¹⁶¹ China also agreed to financial aid. On March 1, Babu announced that China would send 3.5 million shillings of assistance.¹⁶²

New Anxieties for Nyerere

The Zanzibar Revolution created new security challenges for Tanganyika, the most immediate being the Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny. In the days following the uprising, President Nyerere deployed most of his police force to Zanzibar to contain violence and support ASP leadership. With police absent from the mainland, dissatisfied soldiers, emboldened by the Zanzibar revolution, mutinied on January 19.

As the mutiny escalated and threatened his rule, Nyerere turned to Britain for support. On January 25, at the request of Nyerere, sixty Royal Marine commandos from a nearby British carrier landed in Tanganyika and swiftly crushed the Tanganyikan mutiny.¹⁶³

The Zanzibar Revolution and the Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny deepened Nyerere’s fears of Communist subversion by China or Cuba. Publicly, he insisted that “there is no evidence before us to suggest that the mutinies in Tanganyika were inspired by outside forces—either Communist or imperialist.”¹⁶⁴ Privately, however, he was wary of China’s growing influence in Zanzibar, and his government investigated possible Chinese or Cuban involvement in the mutiny.¹⁶⁵ Even though no clear evidence of Communist subversion emerged, concerns that the revolution could invite Communist influence were well-founded. As the meeting between the Soviets and Dennis Phombeah (see page 38), a sympathetic TANU leader, suggests, the revolution had already heightened Soviet interest in Tanganyika.

At the same time, Britain’s intervention in the Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny intensified concerns about Tanganyika’s dependence on the Western bloc. In an interview over two decades after the mutiny, Nyerere framed Britain as opportunistic, accusing it of exploiting instability as a pretext for intervention: “The British would have landed without my permission. It is possible a new mutiny would have been provoked as an excuse. [...] As it is, I did not have much but at least I would ‘play’ I had invited them!”¹⁶⁶

“The British would have landed without my permission. It is possible a new mutiny would have been provoked as an excuse. […] As it is, I did not have much but at least I would ‘play’ I had invited them!”

— Julius Nyerere, on British intervention during the 1964 mutiny

The crisis exposed two fundamental vulnerabilities. First, Nyerere’s sovereignty during the mutiny depended on British intervention, whether invited or not, revealing how easily external powers could override Tanganyika’s control over its own security. Second, Tanganyika’s military remained reliant on British training, ensuring that Britain retained influence over the country’s armed forces.

Nyerere’s fears were not just directed toward the Eastern or Western blocs but toward the Cold War mindset itself. Contrary to his stated ideal of self-sufficiency, Nyerere’s control over his nation depended on outside support, whether from East or West. Following the arrival of British marines in Tanganyika, Nyerere warned, “the presence of troops from a country deeply involved in the world's Cold War conflicts has serious implications in the context of African nationalism.”¹⁶⁷ What unsettled him about British intervention was not just Britain’s colonial legacy but the fact that it remained an active Cold War power.

By April 1964, it was clear that Zanzibar had become a fierce battleground in the Cold War. In Zanzibar, China’s patient strategy distinguished itself from the heavy-handed approaches of the US and USSR. Meanwhile, the revolution’s shockwaves forced Nyerere to confront an unsettling reality: Zanzibar’s instability and Cold War entanglements threatened Tanganyika’s own sovereignty. Sovereignty required finding a third path and subduing Zanzibari radicals like Babu and Hanga whose foreign ties risked further subversion.

V. The Last, Best Choice: Tanzania Turns to China

To contain the influence of Zanzibar’s increasingly powerful progressive forces, Tanganyikan president Nyerere and Zanzibari president Karume met in Dar es Salaam on April 26, 1964, and agreed to unite their countries, forming the United Republic of Tanzania. Nyerere became president, while Karume took on the role of vice president. From this time on, Karume stayed in Zanzibar and ruled the islands’ largely autonomous government.¹⁶⁸ For Nyerere, the Union served his goals of Pan-Africanism. However, Nyerere was also responding to pressure from the United States and Britain, who feared an independent, Communist Zanzibar. For Karume, the Union allowed him to sideline his progressive Zanzibari political rivals: Babu and Hanga. Hence, Nyerere and Karume’s secretive negotiations took place while Babu and Hanga were traveling to China, forcing them to accept the Union fait accompli.¹⁶⁹ Although the Union initially appeared to be a strategic victory for the United States and Britain, mounting Cold War pressures over the next year and Babu’s influence within the united Tanzanian government ultimately pushed Nyerere into China’s open arms.

Soviets and East Germans Intensify Push in Zanzibar

The Soviet Union interpreted the Tanzanian Union as a British attempt to weaken Communist influence in Zanzibar. Just two days after Nyerere announced the Union, the Soviet newspaper Pravda warned that “a great struggle will be required so that the people [of Zanzibar] [...] do not lose their revolutionary gains,” and cautioned that “colonialists hope to use their position to put pressure on the [Zanzibari] government to turn to the right.”¹⁷⁰ Two months later, a Soviet consul in London concluded that the cause of the Tanzanian Union was British pressure.¹⁷¹

Because the Soviets were unwilling to renounce their foothold on the islands, they decided to intensify their efforts in Zanzibar. Following the Union, citing “favorable conditions,” a Soviet operative on the islands requested “significantly more funds” to distribute Soviet literature.¹⁷² A few months later, in December 1964, KGB Chairman met with the head of the Stasi, East Germany’s equivalent of the KGB. During the meeting, the KGB chairman denounced the Union as “a victory of Western powers and Nyerere,” that left Zanzibar with “little prospect of autonomous development.” Stressing Zanzibar’s strategic significance, the chairman claimed, “Zanzibar must be supported as a base for progress and a fist within Tanzania.” He concluded by emphasizing the importance of increased East German involvement in Zanzibar, stating, “All expenses for Zanzibar are justified.”¹⁷³ As discussed in Chapter Four, Zanzibari leaders preferred dealing with East Germans over the Soviets, so Moscow largely relied on East German networks to increase its influence in Zanzibar.

East German and Soviet influence on the islands subsequently grew significantly. Markus Wolf, the head of the Stasi’s foreign intelligence branch, had been dispatched to Zanzibar a few months before Zanzibar merged with Tanganyika. In his memoir, he recounts that despite initial fears that German influence would wane after the Union, Zanzibari autonomy allowed East Germany to build on its position.¹⁷⁴ Before the Union, East Germany had already initiated a major house-building program in Zanzibar. But in the months following the merger, East Germany also introduced medical aid, established a German friendship house, and offered Zanzibar a trade pact.¹⁷⁵ After the Union, the Soviets also offered Zanzibar a hefty thirty-million-pound interest-free loan.¹⁷⁶ Reflecting later on this growing influence, Frank Carlucci, an American consul in Zanzibar, claimed that “I think clearly the Soviets and the East Germans exercised more influence than the Chinese.”¹⁷⁷ Carlucci’s assessment did not prove entirely accurate.

Even with these intensified efforts, the East Germans and the Soviets still struggled to compete with Chinese influence in Zanzibar. Oleg Teterin, a Soviet military advisor stationed in Zanzibar from 1965 to 1966, recalls struggling to publish Soviet perspectives in local newspapers, while Chinese viewpoints regularly appeared in Zanews.¹⁷⁸ Although he maintained friendly relations with his Zanzibari trainees, Teterin was never fully trusted; the Zanzibar secret police closely monitored his activities.¹⁷⁹ East German efforts faced similar setbacks. Markus Wolf remembered that East German aid was frequently overshadowed by Chinese assistance, noting that after Chinese advisors arrived in 1965, “[Secretary of East Germany’s Socialist Unity Party] Ulbricht’s picture had either been removed from public display or was outflanked by bigger and more prominently hung pictures of Mao.”¹⁸⁰ The cause for continued loyalty to China is not entirely clear.

One possible explanation is that cultural and racial considerations pushed Zanzibaris toward the Chinese rather than the Soviets and Germans.¹⁸¹ Zanzibari leader Issa recalled in his biography: “The [Russians] were very mean and arrogant, I can say. The Chinese cultivated rice with the people, but the Europeans would not [...]. Each country helped in its own way, but the Chinese were more akin to us.”¹⁸²

China, likely learning from its negative experiences with Soviet advisors in the 1950s, advocated for equal treatment of locals and Chinese technicians who worked side by side with Zanzibaris.¹⁸³ But race also seemed to be at play. Issa was not the only Zanzibari who lumped Soviets in with other Europeans. Soviet military advisor Teterin recalls walking past a group of Zanzibaris and Chinese advisors who warned each other to be quiet because an mzungu was approaching. In Swahili, mzungu literally means “one who wanders,” but generally refers to white Europeans. Teterin felt offended that Zanzibaris viewed him as a European rather than a Soviet, remarking bitterly: “We are Russians, Soviets, we didn’t have any colonies, we came to help, and they call us ‘white,’ like they once called the colonizers!?”¹⁸⁴

Cold War Pushes Nyerere Away from Superpowers

While the Soviets struggled to gain ground in Zanzibar, their presence increasingly worried Nyerere. An autonomous, increasingly Communist Zanzibar threatened to tear his new country apart. Nyerere hoped the Union would serve his vision of African unity, not the interests of Cold War superpowers. On the day of the Union, he optimistically declared: “Union [...] has been determined by our two Governments for the interests of Africa and African Unity. [...] Unity in our continent does not have to come via Moscow or Washington.”¹⁸⁵ However, in the year following the Union, both Moscow and Washington would challenge Nyerere’s sovereignty over a united Tanzania.

Increased Soviet and East German activity directly threatened Nyerere’s control over Zanzibar. Even before the Union, Nyerere’s intelligence service had warned that the Soviets might attempt to use Zanzibar as an airfield.¹⁸⁶ Although the Soviets provided limited aid to the Tanzanian mainland after the Union, Soviet support to Zanzibar was far larger. The Soviets stationed forty-two military advisors in Zanzibar while sending only eight to the mainland. The Soviets sent half of the advisors to Zanzibar without even notifying the Tanzanian government.¹⁸⁷ Alarmed by intensified Soviet and East German activities, Nyerere informed British officials he was “determined to go to any length to stop the Communists from taking over in Zanzibar.”¹⁸⁸ According to Chinese reports, Soviet military aid intensified in Zanzibar with the explicit goal of displacing Chinese influence.¹⁸⁹ Ironically, this aggressive push inadvertently alienated Nyerere, strengthening China’s relative position in Tanzania.

Nyerere's concerns about the Soviet Union extended beyond Zanzibar. He was also skeptical of Moscow’s broader ambitions in the Third World. In November 1964, in a conversation with the Chinese ambassador in Tanzania, Nyerere complained that the Soviet Union was trying to control the Non-Aligned Movement through its allies India and Egypt and asked if Soviet policy would change after Khrushchev stepped down from power.¹⁹⁰ When the brother of Tanzania’s foreign minister visited China the following year, he criticized the Soviets for their inadequate support of the National Liberation Front in Algeria, while commending China for its more militant backing of the movement.¹⁹¹ Wary of Soviet goals in Zanzibar and Africa, Nyerere deliberately avoided signing cultural exchange agreements with the Soviet Union in 1964 and 1965, even though he had one with China in 1962.¹⁹² By November 1965, a New York Times article claimed that “the Tanzanians have let Russians do nothing but send a handful of veterinarians.”¹⁹³ Throughout the 1960s, Nyerere continued to keep the Soviets at arm’s length.

The Tanzanian Union also elicited increased attention from the United States. Following the merger, both the CIA and the Department of Defense identified personnel expansion in Tanzania as among “their top priorities in Africa.”¹⁹⁴ A larger Western presence, however, also placed increased strain on Nyerere’s Union.

Specifically, Nyerere grew wary of the American and British threat to Zanzibar. Immediately following the Union, The Nationalist – a state-run newspaper closely monitored by Nyerere’s ruling party – continually complained that British and American media were “trying in all forms of [sic] disguises to undermine this union.”¹⁹⁵ Throughout 1964, the British and American intelligence agencies were, in fact, still considering intervention in Zanzibar. Concerned that these plans would come to fruition, Nyerere expelled two American diplomats stationed in Tanzania in January 1965, accusing them of planning an attack on Zanzibar.¹⁹⁶ Later that year, Nyerere also recalled his ambassador to the US.¹⁹⁷ Subversive plots, real or imagined, were not the only thing pushing Nyerere away from Western powers.¹⁹⁸

American and British policies in Africa continued to challenge Nyerere’s vision of African liberation. In November 1964, as part of broader American support for the Léopoldville government in Congo, US aircraft dropped Belgian paratroopers into Congo on a bloody hostage-rescue mission. Throughout 1964, Nyerere had provided arms to Congolese rebels fighting against Léopoldville, placing him in direct opposition to American intervention.¹⁹⁹ Nyerere publicly condemned the Belgian mission, declaring that it was “in defiance of the whole of Africa.”²⁰⁰ Nyerere also grew increasingly frustrated by Britain’s reluctance to take decisive action against white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia. In 1965, when Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence and Britain refused to respond militarily, Nyerere severed formal diplomatic ties with Britain.²⁰¹ By late 1965, Nyerere had grown hesitant to deal with either the Soviet Union or Britain and the United States.

Nyerere Caught in Germany’s Cold War

While Nyerere was caught up in the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States, he also became entangled in a regional Cold War between West and East Germany.²⁰² Following the Zanzibar revolution and the sidelining of Okello, the islands’ leadership vacillated on whether it should recognize East and West Germany.²⁰³ But, by March 1964, one month before the Union, it decided to recognize East Germany.²⁰⁴ Once Zanzibar became subordinate to Tanzania through the Union, the islands’ recognition of East Germany threatened Nyerere’s relationship with West Germany. Nyerere had limited contact with East German officials, but he refused to formally recognize the country due to the Hallstein Doctrine, under which West Germany severed diplomatic relations with countries recognizing East Germany.²⁰⁵ As one of Tanzania’s largest aid providers, West Germany was too valuable for Nyerere to risk losing.

In an attempt to preserve ties with West Germany, Nyerere tried to convince Zanzibari leaders to downgrade the status of their East German embassy, but Zanzibari progressives refused to budge. In response to Zanzibar’s continued support of East Germany, an editorial in TANU’s paper, The Nationalist, accused East Germany of “attempting to destroy our Union in the interests of their desires.” At the same time, the article tried to reassure the Soviets and East Germans that the Union was not an attack on their influence: “It is now necessary to state, once again, that this Union was not established in the interests of any outside power or bloc.”²⁰⁶ In retaliation, the Zanzibari government temporarily banned The Nationalist, accusing it of making “a malicious and unfounded direct accusation against [the] German Democratic Republic.”²⁰⁷ The struggle over recognition dragged on for two months before Nyerere ultimately decided to recognize both Germanies in February 1965.²⁰⁸

West Germany swiftly retaliated. Five days after Nyerere announced his decision to recognize both Germanies, West Germany canceled its plans to build Tanzania’s air force. Outraged by what he saw as an attempt at coercion, Nyerere declared that Tanzania would accept no aid whatsoever from West Germany.²⁰⁹ Reflecting on the incident, Nyerere later remarked, “The Government of Tanzania believed, and still believes, that to have agreed with the West German demands would have been to nullify our real independence.”²¹⁰ Once again, Nyerere learned that refusing to pick sides in the Cold War or its regional conflicts came at a cost.

“The Government of Tanzania believed, and still believes, that to have agreed with the West German demands would have been to nullify our real independence.”

— Julius Nyerere, on refusing West German ultimatums

Tanzania Turns to China

Nyerere feared American and Soviet intervention in Zanzibar, but he was also wary of Chinese influence on the islands. He confided to an American diplomat that Babu had “already selected Zanzibar’s next government. Babu is a Chinaman.”²¹¹ Because China had invested in building ties with Nyerere’s government before the Union and did not want to jeopardize its influence on the mainland, it did its best to assuage Nyerere’s concerns.

Unlike the Cold War superpowers, China respected the Union and proceeded cautiously in Zanzibar. While American, British, and Soviet media expressed skepticism about the merger, China’s People’s Daily unequivocally celebrated it as a step toward African unity.²¹² Although China continued to provide assistance to Zanzibar, China’s aid was far smaller than that of the Soviet Union.²¹³ China also restrained its political activities on the islands. For example, to ensure they would not upset the mainland government, Chinese workers in Zanzibar made sure to consult the Tanzanian consulate before screening Communist films.²¹⁴

China eventually gained influence on the mainland through Babu. After the Union, Nyerere appointed Babu as the Minister of Economic Planning, likely in an attempt to reduce his influence in Zanzibar. Although Nyerere had reservations about Babu’s communist ties and expressed the need to “keep an eye on him at all times,” he respected Babu’s intelligence.²¹⁵ While Babu’s influence in Zanzibar waned after the Union, he exerted considerable influence in the new Tanzanian government.

Babu strengthened Tanzania’s ties with China by facilitating state visits. In June 1964, he accompanied Second Vice President Kawawa to Beijing.²¹⁶ The Chinese greeted them with a grand reception, and thousands gathered at the airport, chanting, “Welcome Kawawa!” and “Welcome Babu!”²¹⁷ During the visit, Kawawa and Babu negotiated with Premier Zhou Enlai, resulting in an economic and technical cooperation agreement as well as exchanging notes for potential Chinese military support.²¹⁸ Zhou reaffirmed China’s unwavering support for the Union and played into Tanzanian fears of Cold War subversion by warning Kawawa of potential “imperialist assassination plots.”²¹⁹ In Beijing, Kawawa hinted that China might offer a way out of the Cold War, declaring, “The Chinese people have shown the world that the greatest force on earth is the human spirit and noble ideals. It is even more powerful than an atomic bomb.”²²⁰ The atomic bomb, of course, served as a synecdoche for the superpowers that had failed Tanzania.

“The Chinese people have shown the world that the greatest force on earth is the human spirit and noble ideals. It is even more powerful than an atomic bomb.”

— Rashidi Kawawa, Second Vice President of Tanzania, in Beijing, 1964

The Chinese military support agreed on shortly after Kawawa’s visit became a key tenet of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship. As Nyerere distanced himself from both Cold War superpowers, he saw Chinese aid as a necessary last resort, telling a South African journalist: “Having made these efforts to obtain what I needed from the Commonwealth and from the middle-sized powers, but without success, what was there left for me to do? [...] The need, therefore, was to secure some kind of balance.”²²¹

Following the Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny in January 1964, Nyerere lost faith in a British-trained military and expelled British military advisors.²²² Tanzania’s need for new military partners was increasingly pressing, and China readily seized the opportunity to fill this void.

Chinese military assistance supported Nyerere’s vision of Tanzania serving as a regional hub for African liberation. By September 1964, China had sent top-performing soldiers to establish two secret training camps in Dar es Salaam, where they trained liberation forces from Mozambique, Angola, and Southern Rhodesia.²²³ Significantly, China fulfilled Tanzanian military requests in a fraction of the time it took Western powers.²²⁴ China’s militant Africa policy meant it was willing to train liberation movements that the Americans and Soviets were hesitant to support, and its prioritization of Tanzania pushed it to act faster and send its very best soldiers.

Alarmed by the Sino-Tanzanian military deal, the American and British governments tried to counter Chinese influence by coordinating military aid from smaller, Western-aligned countries. At their urging, in late 1964, Canada agreed to provide roughly three million dollars to the Tanzanian military and thirty-two Canadian trainers.²²⁵ Around the same time, West Germany committed to training Tanzania’s air force. Additionally, with CIA funding, Israel intensified its efforts, training five hundred Tanzanian soldiers in Israel.²²⁶ Nyerere’s growing skepticism of the West, later exacerbated by West Germany’s decision to renege on its military deal, led China to eventually become Tanzania’s primary military partner.

In the months following Kawawa’s visit to China, Babu orchestrated the most important event in solidifying Sino-Tanzanian relations: Nyerere’s trip to China. Babu personally convinced Nyerere to visit Beijing, for which the Chinese rewarded Babu with a $4,000 gift.²²⁷ Babu then set the agenda for the meeting. Arriving in Beijing two weeks before Nyerere, Babu met with He Ying, the Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania.²²⁸ Babu explained to He Ying that the Soviets and Americans had denied Tanzania’s requests to finance the TANZAM railway and asked that China accept.²²⁹ By the time Nyerere arrived in Beijing for negotiations, Zhou Enlai had already decided China would build the railroad.²³⁰ Babu had effectively laid the groundwork for what would become China's largest foreign aid project.

Nyerere’s visit to China seemed to have a profound personal impact on him. Not only did he secure a substantial aid deal, but he felt a genuine enthusiasm from the Chinese for the relationship with his country. Internally, the visit was a significant event for China, celebrated as a rare diplomatic victory. Nyerere was greeted with fanfare as over ten thousand people welcomed him at the airport, and headlines of the visit appeared on the front page of seven different issues of the People’s Daily.²³¹ Upon returning to Tanzania, Nyerere reflected on the experience, saying, “It is very difficult to describe the enthusiasm.”²³² A Tanzanian official later described the effect the visit had on him: “Before his visit to China, [Nyerere] thought that Westerners liked him. However, after visiting China, he felt that Eastern people, especially the Chinese people, gave him a grand welcome.”²³³

Although China had prioritized Tanzania as early as 1962, it wasn’t until his 1965 visit that Nyerere truly felt the depth of this commitment.

VI. Conclusion

“The supple and weak overcome the hard and strong.”²³⁴

— Laozi

Following Nyerere’s visit to China, the Sino-Tanzanian relationship flourished. Between 1964 and 1970, China became Tanzania’s most active military partner, training some 16,000 liberation fighters in Tanzania.²³⁵ China also began sending medical teams to Tanzania, dispatching five hundred medical missions over the same period.²³⁶ And, most significantly, between 1968 and 1986, China sent 30,000-50,000 engineers to build the TANZAM railway, which operates to this day.²³⁷ By 1971, China was Tanzania’s largest source of foreign aid, and it would use this influence to expand its presence in nearby East African countries.²³⁸

While Western observers would only come to fully recognize the significance of Chinese influence in Tanzania in the late 1960s, a rigorous examination of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship shows that it began earlier.²³⁹ From 1959 to 1965, China prevailed over its competitors to become Tanzania’s partner of choice. First in Zanzibar and Tanganyika and then in Tanzania, China prioritized its partnerships, adjusted to local leaders’ interests, and provided a compelling ideological model for development.

China’s competitors often did just the opposite and lost their positions in Tanzania one by one. Egypt lost its foothold in January 1964 when a revolution overthrew the minority-Arab rule it supported in Zanzibar. The United States, England, West Germany, East Germany, and the Soviet Union lost influence between 1964 and 1965 as they attempted to shape Nyerere’s Union according to their own agendas, used aid as leverage, and disregarded Nyerere’s vision for African liberation and unity. Canadian influence dwindled in the late 1960s as China chipped away at its position.²⁴⁰ The final holdout, Israel, ultimately lost influence when its regional conflict with Egypt escalated beyond what Nyerere was willing to tolerate.²⁴¹

As a new nation builder, Nyerere looked to Tanzania’s international partners for guidance. Instead, he became entangled in their conflicts. Much to his chagrin, Nyerere’s young country became a battleground for both the Cold War between the United States and the USSR and the Arab-Israeli and East-West German regional Cold Wars. Zanzibari, Tanganyikan, and Tanzanian leaders were repeatedly forced to pick sides. As Arne Westad aptly put it, the Cold War proved “bipolar to the point of exclusivity.”²⁴² Navigating such a conflict was, in Nyerere’s words, like “walking on a tightrope.”²⁴³ Lean too far to one side and risk falling.

In a divided world, China presented a third option and had much to offer Nyerere and Zanzibari leaders. China’s policy of non-interference, respect for African unity, and no-strings-attached aid helped dispel fears of subversion. Its revolutionary approach to African liberation movements, combined with an emphasis on nationalism over socialism, aligned with Tanzania’s anti-colonial stance. Moreover, Mao’s development model presented an attainable path to self-sufficiency. Finally, China’s commitment to the relationship – evident through high-level engagement and lavish welcomes – won the hearts of Tanzania’s leadership.

However, the attractive characteristics of friendship with China arose from its isolation in the Cold War. In other words, China’s relative strengths were rooted in its relative weaknesses. Unlike other non-aligned countries like Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt, which accepted aid from both the Americans and Soviets, China took aid from neither and antagonized both. It had few allies and faced animosity from nearly every power vying for influence in Tanzania. China’s non-alignment of isolation – friendship with none rather than friendship with all – meant it could not control Tanzania’s foreign policy even if it wanted to. Doing so would have required pressuring Tanzania to distance itself from China’s long list of enemies. In the late 1960s, China attempted to pressure Nyerere to move against the US and later against the Soviet Union. Both times, Nyerere refused.²⁴⁴

China’s relative weakness also came from its struggle to gain influence elsewhere in Africa.²⁴⁵ As it lost ground to the Soviets and Americans on the continent, China grew increasingly determined to secure a diplomatic victory, pouring resources and effort into Tanzania. China’s drive to build influence likely explains its non-interference policy; China could not afford to jeopardize its position by attempting to dictate Tanzania’s domestic policy. China’s urgency also explains why it committed to ambitious aid projects that others shunned, delivered on promises faster, and welcomed Tanzanian leaders with grand ceremonies and face time with top officials. In contrast, when dealing with the United States and the Soviet Union, Tanzanian leaders often had to navigate layers of intermediaries and cumbersome bureaucracies. The Soviets and Americans were busy attending to the world, while China concentrated its efforts on smaller targets.

Likewise, Tanzania’s warm reception of China was both a demonstration of its leaders’ ideological strength and a reflection of their Cold War vulnerabilities. While Nyerere and Babu were sometimes guilty of “hedging” – seeking aid from both East and West – they nonetheless acted on their strong convictions at key moments in Tanzania’s national development, even when it meant forgoing potential partnerships. Babu, a labor activist and sincere Communist, transformed a racialist revolution into a socialist one and, through a union initially designed to sideline him, helped shape the direction of Tanzania’s future. Nyerere boldly pursued his visions of African socialism, non-alignment, and African liberation and unity, even when his commitment to these ideals forced him to cut ties with America, Britain, and West Germany.

These bold moves also emerged from underlying weaknesses. The Zanzibari Revolution, the Tanganyika Rifles mutiny, and Nyerere’s struggle to assert sovereignty over Zanzibar after the Union all revealed the fragility of the region and its subjection to the whims of Cold War superpowers. Additionally, Babu and Nyerere – both avowed non-racialists – had to grapple with the persistent racial antagonisms rooted in their country’s colonial past.

Despite their many differences, China and Tanzania found common ground in their shared sense of isolation and uncertainty. China had few friends, and Tanzania struggled to discern between friend and foe. As both nations wrestled with these realities, they forged a relationship rooted in the ethos of “the poor helping the poor.”²⁴⁶ Yet their poverty was not just material – it was a poverty within the Cold War system itself. In this sense, their partnership was as much a testament to their shared vulnerability as it was to their ideological alignment.

What might these lessons reveal about the future of Sino-Tanzanian relations? China remains one of Tanzania’s closest military partners, and just last year, it pledged a billion-dollar project to revamp the TANZAM railway.²⁴⁷ To this day, China continues to emphasize the aid policy it established during the Cold War. However, today’s China more closely resembles Khrushchev’s Soviet Union than Mao’s China. Whereas China’s vulnerability in the 1960s prompted promises of non-interference and unconditional aid, its superpower status in the twenty-first century may lead it to adopt some of the rigid, strong-armed aid policies characteristic of its former adversaries.

Acknowledgments

Mao once said, “Many hands make light work,” and Nyerere once claimed, “It is not long before an individual, working alone, reaches the limit of his powers. Only by working together can men overcome that limitation.”²⁴⁸ I do not often find myself in agreement with Mao and Nyerere, but writing this thesis has proven their communitarian sentiments true. I cannot imagine this project without all of the people who generously supported me throughout the last year.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Valerie Hansen, for teaching me to think like a scholar, encouraging me to write when I needed a nudge, and caring about her students as people first. I would like to thank Yale PhD candidates Yasmina Martin and Niko Graf Vitzthum, Professor Benedito Machava, and Professor Arne Westad for orienting me in a daunting field of research. I am eternally thankful for and impressed by Yale’s Chinese librarian, Michael Meng. I am also grateful for Professor Ruodi Duan of Haverford College, Professor Thomas Burgess of the US Naval Academy, Professor Paul Bjerk of Texas Tech, Dr. Alicia Altorfer-Ong, Dr. Alex White, and Professor Chen Jian of NYU Shanghai, who volunteered their time, expertise, and material only out of the goodness of their hearts. Thank you to the Yale History Department for funding, which I used to visit the Michael Lofchie collection of Zanzibar Publications at the UCLA Library of Special Collections.

To “Daktari” Jennifer Coffman of James Madison University, thank you for opening my mind to new ideas and giving the world’s best introduction to Tanzania at JMU’s East Africa Field School. I also want to thank those who helped me with my translations. Though I am better at squash than Axel de Vernou, he is better at Russian, and this paper would not have been possible without him. I am also grateful for Niko’s help with German, Isabel Arroyo’s help with Arabic, and Tony Munene’s help with Swahili (asante sana).

Finally, I thank my parents, Val and Dave, and my girlfriend, Anna, for enduring my thesis stress and my long ramblings about Babu and Nyerere, whom Anna calls “nay nay.”

Bibliographic Essay

About eight months ago, I was hunkered down on a seven-hour-long bus ride somewhere in Western Kenya. In the countryside, Kenyan infrastructure is rudimentary, so these rides were full of dust, flat tires, and bumps better suited for amusement parks. The Great Rift Valley is beautiful but barren in the summer. Aside from scattered mud homes with metal sheet roofs, the view is limited to acacias and bright sun. During this ride, however, the skyline was broken by an imposing white railway station. As we got closer, I could make out red Chinese characters on the building. A Google search told me this was a stop on the Standard Gauge Railway. The railway is being built with Chinese loans as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. A bit more reading explained the railroad had a predecessor; in the 1970s, China financed and built the TANZAM railway, a railroad from Tanzania through Zambia.

Chinese presence only became more palpable after crossing the border into Tanzania. My host family in Dar es Salaam spent the nights watching Chinese soap operas, and I spent one day after class wandering through the city’s crowded Confucius Institute. Chinese influence peaked in Zanzibar, where every few blocks, I saw a “China Aid” sign. One night in my hotel, I met a Chinese history PhD student. As we watched the sunset together, we spoke in a mix of Chinese and English. The conversation was filled as much with mutual respect as it was with distrust. I was a Yale student on a trip sponsored by the Department of Defense. He studied at Beida, the Harvard of China, and seemed to be in Zanzibar for analogous reasons. It felt like we were the next generation of Cold Warriors, unexpectedly sharing a moment of humanity. We never exchanged names, but before he left, he told me, “Zanzibar is very special for the Chinese.”

After that summer, I returned to Yale determined to unearth the roots of Chinese influence in Tanzania. I began with the TANZAM railway, which appeared to be the origin of Chinese involvement. Agreed on by China and Tanzania in 1965, the railroad was China’s most expensive foreign aid project at the time. Its construction required sending tons of Chinese grain and thousands of experts to East Africa, all while China was undergoing the Cultural Revolution and extreme poverty. Why would China devote so many resources to distant lands when its house was not in order?

My question was not answered after reading several histories of the railroad. The railway’s histories tended to fall into two categories. One strain, typified by the work of Jamie Monson, explained that the railway’s construction resulted from ideological common ground, which depicted the railway as a spontaneous act of altruism that effectively emerged out of thin air. The other strain, typified by the work of George Yu, explained the railway as a means of communist infiltration and exploitation of Tanzania. This reading portrayed China as purely self-interested. I felt that there must be a middle ground. These works also left other questions unanswered. Why Tanzania? Why not Mali, Egypt, Algeria, or Guinea? Surely there were pre-existing links between China and Tanzania that led to the emergence of such a big project.

To orient myself before exploring possible Sino-Tanzanian connections before the railway, I read works on Tanzanian history, the Cold War, and Chinese aid to Africa. For Tanzanian history, I started with Priya Lal and Paul Bjerk’s work, and for an introduction to the Global Cold War, I read Professor Westad’s work. The Global Cold War clarified that the Third World, specifically Africa, was a key battleground in Sino-Soviet competition. To further pursue this thread, I read the work of Chen Jian, Jeremy Friedman, Donovan Chau, and Igho Natufe.

I met with Chinese librarian Michael Meng, Professor Westad, Professor Benedito Machava, Professor Chen Jian, Yasmina Martin, a Yale PhD candidate in Tanzanian history, and Niko Graf Vitzthum, a Yale PhD candidate in Cold War history, all of whom helped suggest sources. At the outset, the two most helpful sources were declassified CIA reports and a Chinese-language dissertation by Jiang Huajie submitted to East China Normal University in 2014, which contextualized Chinese aid to Africa with the Cold War. Using these sources, I was able to start to formulate a hypothesis: China first gained influence via Zanzibari elites. After Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined to form Tanzania, Chinese influence grew through its Zanzibari connections.

At this point, I began exploring secondary sources on Zanzibar. I found the works of Jonathon Glassman, Michael Lofchie, and Thomas Burgess most helpful. My hypothesis seemed extremely persuasive and, from what I knew, novel. Then I discovered Alicia Altorfer-Ong’s London School of Economics dissertation. It made precisely the argument I hoped to make, clearly tracing the roots of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship to Chinese support of radical Zanzibaris. Dr. Altorfer-Ong’s research was outstanding, and she had access to the archives of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which are now closed. From here, I did not know where to go. I was worried that anything I wrote would be a shadow of her work.

However, I still had a question not answered by her dissertation. In the 1960s, many Cold War powers vied for influence in Zanzibar and Tanzania. During my research, I found mentions of Soviet, American, West German, East German, Israeli, Egyptian, Yugoslavian, Canadian, British, and Czech actors engaged in Tanzania. To answer the question, “Why did China become the partner of choice for Tanzania?” requires also asking, “Why did nobody else?” The story of Chinese foreign policy success in Tanzania was also the story of foreign policy failure by other countries. My thesis would seek to connect the two topics.

The ideal source for such a paper would be the Tanzanian archives. Unfortunately, as is often the case across Africa, Tanzania’s archives are largely in disarray and difficult to access.²⁴⁹ The silence of the African archives poses significant methodological challenges. Namely, it can force the historian to rely only on discursive accounts by foreign – usually Western – forces in Tanzania. These accounts frequently infantilize African leaders and can tempt the historian into underestimating the autonomy of African participants in the Cold War.

What Paul Bjerk calls the “iterability” of Cold War archival coverage further complicates the search for an accurate depiction of reality.²⁵⁰ Coverage of the Third World by Cold War participants often rely on clichés popular in foreign policy circles to fit their assessments into their nation’s ideological and institutional frameworks. While Bjerk mainly works with American accounts of Tanzania and wrestles with iterative phrases like “African Cuba” or “comic opera,” iterability is present in accounts by all involved powers. Soviet officials’ use of terms like “imperialism” and Chinese terms like “big-power chauvinism” must be read in the context of the country’s Cold War rhetoric. Sometimes, Cold War fears of competition and subversion even lead observers to entirely false conclusions, as with the CIA’s conclusion that Babu instigated the Zanzibar Revolution.

Paul Bjerk also provides compelling solutions to these methodological challenges, writing, “research in Tanzanian history must consider a notional ‘grand archive’ that consists of material spread across dozens of archival collections in Tanzania and around the world.”²⁵¹ In addition to traditional archival sources, Bjerk argues that historians of Tanzania should consider newspapers, non-discursive media, memoirs, and the writing and oral histories of those involved. In this paper, I have attempted to expand the “grand archive” as much as possible, including Tanzanian, Zanzibari, Chinese, West and East German, Soviet, American, British, Canadian, and Egyptian accounts. Examining Tanganyikan, Zanzibari, and Tanzanian sources challenges outsiders’ depictions of African leaders as passive and malleable. Broad sourcing also serves to fend off the paranoia and exaggeration that can appear in Cold War accounts. By cross-checking an interpretation of an event with accounts from parties with divergent interests – say, comparing an American account with a Soviet one – I could approach something closer to reality than the story provided by any single account. Finally, this strategy directly served my goal of understanding how China’s ascension in Tanzania related to other powers’ failure.

However, this approach also posed a serious problem. I, an undergraduate with limited time and funds, could not travel to all the relevant archives. Just accessing relevant documents from US archives would require visiting the LBJ Library in Texas, the National Archives in Maryland, and the JFK Library in Boston. Relevant British documents are similarly scattered across England. I would also have to travel to the Canadian archives in Ottawa, the German archives in Berlin, not to mention the Israeli, Czech, Cuban, Yugoslavian, and Egyptian archives. For obvious reasons, I could not visit Russia to access the Soviet archives, and the relevant Chinese archives are closed to the public.

Hence, I attempted to access as many of these archival documents as possible from New Haven. I contacted many authors who had worked with the relevant archives, speaking over the phone or via email with Dr. Alex White, Professor Ruodi Duan, Professor Thomas Burgess, Professor Paul Bjerk, Dr. Alicia Altorfer-Ong, and Professor Alex Balezin. While I cannot identify them by name because it could jeopardize their future access to Chinese archives, some of these generous scholars provided me with scans from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. I also purchased some scans from the UK National Archives. Additionally, I found many declassified CIA documents on the CIA’s website, and discovered relevant Russian archival documents in a collection, Rossiya i Afrika: Dokumenty i materialy, 1961 – nachalo 1970-kh, available through East View’s Slavic and Judaica E-Book collection. Finally, I gathered various documents through the Wilson Center Digital Archive.

My second solution was to rely on existing scholarship from across the world. Many academics before me have used the above archives to tell Tanzania’s story. Jonathon Glassman made extensive use of the UK National Archives; Jiang Huajie, Alicia Altorfer-Ong, Ruodi Duan of Chinese archives; Paul Bjerk of US archives; Eric Burton, Werner Kilian, and George Roberts of German archives; Christopher Kilford of Canadian archives; Alex Balezin of Soviet archives; and Jermey Friedman and Gregg Brazinsky of the Soviet and Chinese archives. Though the Chicago Manual of Style does not recommend citing primary sources accessed through secondary sources, it was often my only option to complete such an ambitious project. In my footnotes, whenever I have relied on another scholar's archival research, I note both the scholar’s work and the archival sources they are drawing upon. I have included only archival sources to which I had full access to in my bibliography.

I also drew on globally sourced memoirs, oral histories, and writings by people involved in relevant events. I found a memoir by Zhou Boping and a chapter by He Ying, both Chinese ambassadors to Tanzania in the 1960s. I located a book by Donald Petterson, an American diplomat in Zanzibar, and interviews with Frank Carlucci, another American diplomat in Zanzibar, and John Burns, the American ambassador to Tanzania. I referenced a book by the former head of East German foreign intelligence, Markus Wolf, who was sent to Zanzibar. I also utilized Babu’s works and Burgess’s biography of Ali Sultan Issa, which relies on extensive interviews. Writings and speeches by Nyerere, which are available in published collections, allowed me to flesh out the Tanzanian side of the story. Finally, I discovered an oral history of Oleg Teterin, a Soviet military advisor stationed in Zanzibar.

Because my direct access to archival sources was limited, I supplemented my primary sources with newspapers. I sifted through Renmin ribao [People’s Daily] (on OriProbe digital archive), Pravda (on East View Pravda Digital Archive), Egyptian newspapers (on East View Global Press Archive), and various American and British newspapers (on The New York Times online archives and Newspapers.com). I also spent time with the post-Union Tanzanian Paper, The Nationalist, available on microfilm at Yale. The bulk of my efforts, however, were directed towards Zanzibari newspapers. Over break, I spent two days at the Michael Lofchie Special Collection at UCLA. The Michael Lofchie collection is the only collection with surviving hard copies of certain Zanzibari newspapers, including Zanews, a Chinese-sponsored paper.

While I can read Chinese and, of course, English, I cannot read Arabic, Russian, German, or Swahili. When dealing with these languages, I translated through ChatGPT and Google Translate. Before including content in this paper, I checked the translations with proficient readers in those languages. To cite sources from foreign languages or archives with which I was not familiar, I also checked with my translators and conventions set by published authors using these archives.

When I decided to write about Tanzania in the 1960s, I had no idea that there was already so much rich scholarship on the topic. Many authors who came before me had access to archives that I could not visit. My essay seeks to draw together these authors' sometimes disparate threads of research conducted in different languages to create a unified narrative of how the Chinese managed to gain influence in Tanzania and prevail over other richer Cold War rivals.

Abridged Chronology

Bibliography

Archival Sources with Full Access

American

CIA. “Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu.” April 1970. Now declassified and available at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/ABDULRAHMAN%20MOHAMED%20BABU%20%5B15687618%5D.pdf.

CIA. “Central Intelligence Bulletin.” November 27, 1964. Now declassified and available at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A008000210001-9.pdf.

CIA. Soviet Foreign Aid to the Less Developed Countries: Retrospect and Prospect. February 9, 1966. Now declassified and available at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000326121.pdf.

CIA. Tanzania Taking the Left Turn. May 21, 1965. Now declassified and available at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030002-6.pdf.

CIA. The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference. February 1, 1963. Now declassified and available at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1.pdf.

CIA. Zanzibar: The Hundred Days’ Revolution. February 21, 1966. Now declassified and available at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/esau-28.pdf.

Foreign Relations of the United States. 1961–1963. Volume XVII.

Near East, 1961–1962. Doc. 142. “Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Kennedy.” November 21, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d142.

Foreign Relations of the United States. 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa. Doc. 182. “Visit of

Prime Minister Douglas-Home February 12-13, 1964.” February 7, 1964. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d182.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Agricultural Economy of Tanganyika. Economic Research

Service Report, 1964. https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/jq085j963/xk81jp91d/2n49t5006/ERSF-09-07-1964_The_Agricultural_Economy_of_Tanganyika.pdf.

British

National Archives. Colonial Office 822/3063. "Zanzibar Intelligence Summaries." 1963.

National Archives. Foreign Office 1110/2308/20. "China and the 3rd Afro-Asian People’s

Solidarity Conference at Moshi (Feb. 4–11).” March 14, 1963.

Chinese

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00032-01. General Office, Committee for

External Cultural Relations 对外文委. “Zhou zongli jiejian Tanganika wenhua daibiaotuan tanhua jilu” 周总理接见坦噶尼喀文化代表团谈话记录 [Record of Premier Zhou Enlai’s conversation with the Tanganyika cultural delegation]. November 11, 1963.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00223-07. International Liaison Department of the Communist Youth League Central Committee. “Kamailong, Tansangniya qingnian daibiaotuan fang Hua jianbao” 喀麦隆，坦桑尼亚，刚果，乌干达，阿尔及利亚等青年代表团要求援助事 [Brief report on the visit of Cameroonian and Tanzanian youth delegations to China]. April 29, 1960.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00276-01. “Tanfanghua daibiaotuan chengyuan qingkuang ji yaoqiu” 坦访华代表团成员情况及要求 [Members of the Tanzanian delegation to China and their requirements]. Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council 国务院外事办公室 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs 外交部. 1962.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00276-01. "Guanyu Zhong-Tan huhuan wenhua daibiaotuan shi" 关于中坦互换文化代表团事 [Regarding the mutual exchange of cultural delegations between China and Tanganyika]. PRC Embassy in Tanganyika 驻坦使馆 to the Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations 对外文委 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 外交部. August 31, 1962.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00276-03. “Wenhua daibiaotuan fang Tan qingkuang" 文化代表团访坦情况 [Situation of the cultural delegation’s visit to Tanganyika]. Zhu Guang 朱光 to the Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations 对外文委 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 外交部. December 14, 1962.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00276-05. “Gao Ali Tanbuwei zai Hua de zhuyao qingkuang” 告阿里.坦布维在华的主要情况 [Report on the main situation of Ali Tambwe in China]. Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations 对外文委. October 23, 1962.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00276-06. Foreign Cultural Affairs Office.

"Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian Tanganika wenhua daibiaotuan tanhua jilu" 周恩来总理接见坦噶尼喀文化代表团谈话记录 [Record of Premier Zhou Enlai’s conversation with the Tanganyika cultural delegation]. October 19, 1962.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00276-07. "Chen Yi fu zongli jiejian

Tanganika wenhua daibiaotuan tuanzhang Tanbuwei de tanhua jiyao" 陈毅副总理接见坦噶尼喀文化代表团团长坦布维的谈话纪要 [Summary of Vice Premier Chen Yi’s conversation with Tanganyika cultural delegation leader Tambwe]. General Office. Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations 对外文委. November 10, 1962.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00284-06. “Guoqing waibin jiedai gongzuo jianbao” 国庆外宾接待工作简报 [Briefing on National Day reception work for foreign guests]. Office for National Day Foreign Guest Reception. Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations 对外文委. October 6, 1962.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00955-02. “Bao Zhongguo wenhua youhao daibiaotuan fangwen Feizhou wu guo zongjie baogao” 报中国文化友好代表团访问周非洲五国总结报告 [Report on the summary of the Chinese cultural friendship delegation’s visit to five African countries]. Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations 对外文委. March 12, 1963.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00974-01. Xinhua News Agency 中国新华 通讯 to Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations 对外文委. 1964.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-00977-01. Liao Cheng 廖承. “Guowuyuan

Waishi Bangongshi dui Waiwenwei qingshi baogao de pishi zailu” 国务院外事办公室对外文委请示报告的批示摘录 [Extract from the State Council Foreign Affairs Office's instructions on the Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations’ report]. August 19, 1964.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-01101-04. “Tansangniya zhengzhi qingkuang jianjie” 坦桑尼亚政治情况简介 [Brief overview of Tanzania's political situation]. Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations 对外文委. 1965.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-01101-04. “Tansangniya waizhang zhi di

Aodini Kanbona qingkuang (si)” 坦桑尼亚外长之弟奥蒂尼.坎博纳情况(四) [Situation of Ottini Kambona, younger brother of the Tanzanian Foreign Minister (Part 4)]. Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations 对外文委. May 10, 1965.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 108-01318-07. “Zhou zongli he Kawawa di’er fu zongtong tanhua jiyao” 周总理和卡瓦瓦第二副总统谈话纪要 [Summary of Premier Zhou's conversation with Vice President Kawawa]. June 17, 1964.

Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. File No. 113-00397-15. “Nileier tanhua jianbao” 尼雷 尔谈话简报 [Report on Conversation with Nyerere]. He Ying 何英 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs 外交部. November 1, 1964.

German

Bundesbeauftragte für die Stasi-Unterlagen [Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi

Records]. Ministry for State Security. SdM 576. 1–30. “Stasi Report on Meetings with the KGB, 30 November - 1 December 1964.” December 2, 1964. Wilson Center Digital Archive. Translated by Bernd Schaefer. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/stasi-report-meetings-kgb-30-november-1-december-1964.

Soviet

Arkhiv vneshneĭ politikoĭ Rossisskoĭ Federatsii [Archive of the foreign policy of the Russian

Federation]. f.591, o.7, papka 3 d.4, 4–5. “O rasprostranenii sovetskoy literatury na Zanzibare” [On the dissemination of Soviet literature in Zanzibar]. G.I. Karlov to S.K. Romanovskomu. August 3, 1964. In S. V. Mazov, A. B. Davidson, A. S. Balezin, and A. V. Voevodskii, eds. Rossiia i Afrika: Dokumenty i materialy, 1961 – nachalo 1970-kh [Russia and Africa: Documents and Materials, 1961 – Early 1970s]. Politicheskaya entsiklopediya, 2021. Document 258.

Arkhiv vneshneĭ politikoĭ Rossisskoĭ Federatsii [Archive of the foreign policy of the Russian

Federation]. f.591, o.8, papka 4 d.9, 9–12. “Proyekt Protokola o kulturnom obmene mezhdu SSSR i Tanzaniey” [Draft Protocol on Cultural Exchange between the USSR and Tanzania]. A. A. Petrov to A. M. Timoshenko. November 13, 1965. In S. V. Mazov, A. B. Davidson, A. S. Balezin, and A. V. Voevodskii, eds. Rossiia i Afrika: Dokumenty i materialy, 1961 – nachalo 1970-kh [Russia and Africa: Documents and Materials, 1961 – Early 1970s]. Politicheskaya entsiklopediya, 2021. Document 263.

Gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv Rossisskoĭ Federatsii [State archive of the Russian Federation]. f.Z9540. o.1. d.124, 59. M.S. Amirdzhanova. “Zapis' besedy I.I. Potekhina s predsedatelem partii «Afrikanskii natsional'nyi soyuz Tanganyiki» N'yerere” [Record of the conversation of I.I. Potekhin with the Chairman of the party “Tanganyika African National Union” Nyerere]. June 19, 1962. In S. V. Mazov, A. B. Davidson, A. S. Balezin, and A. V. Voevodskii, eds. Rossiia i Afrika: Dokumenty i materialy, 1961 – nachalo 1970-kh [Russia and Africa: Documents and Materials, 1961 – Early 1970s]. Politicheskaya entsiklopediya, 2021. Document 246.

Rossisskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ arkhiv noveisheĭ istorii [Russian state archive of contemporary history]. f.5, o.50, d.642, 2-8. "Zapis' besedy v SKSSAA s general'nym sekretarem Komiteta afrikanskikh organizatsii v Londone Denisom Pombea o rabote sovetskogo posol'stva i polozhenii v Tangan'ike” [Record of a Conversation at SKSSAA with the Secretary General of the Committee of African Organizations in London, Denis Pombea, on the Work of the Soviet Embassy and the Situation in Tanganyika]. January 11, 1964. In S. V. Mazov, A. B. Davidson, A. S. Balezin, and A. V. Voevodskii, eds. Rossiia i Afrika: Dokumenty i materialy, 1961 – nachalo 1970-kh [Russia and Africa: Documents and Materials, 1961 – Early 1970s]. Politicheskaya entsiklopediya, 2021. Document 250.

Newspaper Articles

American

"A Cuba Off Africa?" New York Times. January 14, 1964. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1964/01/14/97158126.html?pageNumber=30.

Fellows, Lawrence. “China is Leading in Tanzania Aid.” The New York Times. June 10, 1965. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1965/06/10/97209082.html?pageNumber=7.

Fleisher, Steven M. "The Aftermath of a Revolution." Yale Daily News. January 22, 1964. https://ydnhistorical.library.yale.edu/?a=d&d=YDN19640122-01.2.1.

Middleton, Drew. “Tanzanian Denies Peking Influence.” The New York Times. March 17, 1966. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1966/03/17/79975382.html?pageNumber=17.

The New York Times. “China to Train Tanzanians.”October 6, 1969. https://www.nytimes.com/1969/10/06/archives/china-to-train-tanzanians.html?searchResultPosition=1.

The New York Times. “Tanzanian to Visit Red China.” June 3, 1968. https://www.nytimes.com/1968/06/03/archives/tanzanian-to-visit-red-china.html?searchResultPosition=3.

The New York Times. “Tanzania-Zambia Railway: a Bridge to China?” January 29, 1971. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/29/archives/tanzaniazambia-railway-a-bridge-to-china.html?searchResultPosition=10.

British

Legum, Colin. “China's African Gamble.” The Observer. September 27, 1964. https://theguardian.newspapers.com/image/258814182/?match=1&terms=china%20egypt%20nyerere%20legum%20somalia.

Legum, Colin. “China Will Train Nyerere’s Army.” The Observer, August 30, 1964. https://theguardian.newspapers.com/image/258809027/?match=1&terms=colin%20legum%20china%20army.

Legum, Colin. “If South Africa stays Ghana will go: Tanganyika gives warning, too." The

Observer. March 12, 1961. https://theguardian.newspapers.com/image/257657356/?match=1&terms=ghana%20colin%20legum%20nyerere.

Legum, Colin. “Nyerere: Why I called in the Chinese.” The Observer. August 30, 1964. https://theguardian.newspapers.com/image/258809094/?match=1&terms=Nyerere.

Chinese

(People’s Daily available through OriProbe digital archive)

Jin 金. "Sanggeiba’er renmin jue bu qufu" 桑给巴尔人民决不屈服 [The people of Zanzibar will never surrender]. Renmin ribao 人民日报. December 18, 1959. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19591218/6/87704b21b6694ea2983412b2ff42c690_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Chen Yi waizhang zhidian Babu waizhang woguo chengren

Sanggeiba’er er Gongheguo” 陈毅外长致电巴布外长 我国承认桑给巴尔共和国 [Foreign Minister Chen Yi cables Foreign Minister Babu: our country recognizes the Republic of Zanzibar]. January 18, 1964. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19640118/1/f9c7b9dc36b9453fb17e98401ea5d33c_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Jineiya, Tanganika, Alian xianhou tichu jiejue Zhong-Yin bianjie chongtu jianyi” 几内亚、坦噶尼喀、阿联先后提出解决中印边界冲突建议 [Guinea, Tanganyika, and the UAR successively propose solutions to the Sino-Indian border conflict]. November 19, 1962. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19621119/1/46a2d8822f734a0aa87bbb733463bb94_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. “Kawawa di’er fu zongtong shuai daibiaotuan dao Shanghai” 卡瓦瓦第 二副总统率代表团到上海 [Vice President Kawawa leads delegation to Shanghai]. June 11, 1964. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19640611/1/16bc5b6ef4544cdb945be8633b830be6_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. “Kawawa fu zongtong juxing gaobie yanhui Dong fu zhuxi Zhu weiyuanzhang Zhou zongli deng lingdaoren” 卡瓦瓦副总统举行告别宴会董副主席朱委员长周总理等领导人 [Vice President Kawawa holds farewell banquet attended by Vice Chairman Dong, Chairman Zhu, Premier Zhou, and other leaders]. June 17, 1964. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19640617/1/955a5a32ab4a4c1dba75bb2d142ecae6_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Lai zi Feizhou de ge daibiaotuan he daibiao likai Beijing qu gedi canguan” 来自非洲的各代表团和代表 离开北京去各地参观 [The various delegations and representatives from Africa left Beijing to visit different places]. May 7, 1960. https://data.people.com.cn/pd/rmrb/detail.html?id=8c1fd9f64ca447499cdbdee541527bb6.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. “Liu zhuxi dian he Tansang chengli lianhe gongheguo bing zhufuhe

Nileier jiuren lianhe gongheguo zongtong” 刘主席电贺坦桑成立联合共和国并祝贺尼雷尔就任联合共和国总统 [Chairman Liu cables congratulations on the establishment of the United Republic of Tanzania and congratulates Nyerere on assuming office as president of the United Republic]. May 1, 1964. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19640501/2/78135dcb52b64248a227ff05f486e524_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. “Lu fu zongli jiejian Sanggeiba’er keren” 陆副总理接见桑给巴尔客 人 [Vice Premier Lu receives guests from Zanzibar]. June 1, 1964. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19640601/3/437e00a8648046a69ad5980bfe437178_prin t.html

Renmin ribao 人民日报. “Nileier zongtong dao Shanghai shoudao relie huanying” 尼雷尔总统 到上海受到热烈欢迎 [President Nyerere arrives in Shanghai to a warm welcome]. February 17, 1965. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19650217/1/45c325ae01a64fe5a4c731c41e0696dd_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Nileier zongtong shuo Zhongguo renmin shi fenfa tuqiang de renmin [...]” 尼雷尔总统说中国人民是奋发图强的人民 [President Nyerere says the Chinese people are hardworking and ambitious]. February 27, 1965. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19650227/3/55615aa07a474b4ea5c7300ca0898dc4_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. “Relie huanying Nileier zongtong” 热烈欢迎尼雷尔总统 [Warmly welcome President Nyerere]. February 17, 1965. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19650217/1/c73065c77d054856890c58fa8a6303e3_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Saipulusi gonghui daibiaotuan dao Beijing” 塞浦路斯工会代表团到 北京 [Cypriot trade union delegation arrives in Beijing]. April 23, 1960. https://data.people.com.cn/pd/rmrb/detail.html?id=3f222cb73f1f46b5893540f96069bed3.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Sanggeiba’er fasheng zhengbian zucheng xin zhengfu [...]” 桑给巴尔 发生政变组成新政府 [Zanzibar undergoes a coup and forms a new government].

January 15, 1964. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19640115/5/53fdcd48b3e44592ab2e617109057a4a_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Sanggeiba’er he Sailalewone liang daibiaotuan fan guo” 桑给巴尔和 塞拉勒窝内两代表团返国 [Zanzibar and Sierra Leone delegations return home]. August 22, 1960. https://data.people.com.cn/pd/rmrb/detail.html?id=04e33b9ebd8544a0bfd61dbbdc0a95d9.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Sanggeiba’er minzuzhuyi dang daibiaotuan renyuan dao Jing” 桑给巴 尔民族主义党代表团人员到京 [Zanzibar Nationalist Party delegation members arrive in Beijing]. July 26, 1960. https://data.people.com.cn/pd/rmrb/detail.html?id=88dd2ab950694544b1c32f70859c0fa8.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Sangeiba'er yi keren dao Jing” 桑给巴尔一客人到京 [A guest from

Zanzibar arrives in Beijing]. December 20, 1962. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19621220/4/7c5e895d8a2447cf8790ec4497ce997b_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Shehuizhuyi dai lai le xin shijie” 社会主义带来了新世界 [Socialism has brought a new world]. June 18, 1960. https://data.people.com.cn/pd/rmrb/detail.html?id=66437a01ff054cd2baab1d7f680dd336.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Tanganika jinri duli” 坦噶尼喀今日独立 [Tanganyika becomes independent today]. December 9, 1961. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19611209/4/468e2117e0324f7d9610bb5c0c6da7cb_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. “Wo zhu Alian dashi Chen Jiakang baifang Sanggeiba’er zizhi zhengfu zongli” 我驻阿联大使陈家康拜访桑给巴尔自治政府总理 [Chinese Ambassador to the UAR Chen Jiakang visits the Prime Minister of the Zanzibar Autonomous Government]. October 15, 1963. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19631015/3/5ded5c6ba7484683932bfef32ca4b4be_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. “You Nileier zongtong fang Hua xianqian zu fuzeren Babu buzhang shuailing Tansangniya zhengfu maoyi daibiaotuan dao Jing” 由尼雷尔总统访华先遣组负责人巴布部长率领坦桑尼亚政府贸易代表团到京 [Tanzanian government trade delegation led by Minister Babu, head of the advance team for President Nyerere's visit to China, arrives in Beijing]. February 8, 1965. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19650208/1/bf60b31282b94d38a1708c1287394716_print.html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. “Zhongguo he Mali lianhe gongbao” 中国和马里联合公报 [Joint communique between China and Mali]. Renmin ribao 人民日报. January 22, 1964. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19640122/1/6abcd6f2589a49b6aa080e9261086948_print .html.

Renmin ribao 人民日报. "Zhongguo renmin yongyuan shi Tangganika renmin de zhongshi pengyou” 中国人民永远是坦噶尼喀人民的忠实朋友 [The Chinese people will always be loyal friends of the people of Tanganyika]. January 10, 1961. https://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/19610110/6/14abdf6b2dfc46d99f83f21fdc1ccbb8_print.html.

Egyptian

Al-Jumhūriyyah. “al-Duktūr Ḥātim Yastaqbil Wafd Zanjibār” [Dr. Hatim receives the Zanzibar delegation]. October 15, 1963. https://gpa.eastview.com/crl/mena/newspapers/jumh19631015-01.1.4.

Al-Jumhūriyyah. “Najāḥ Mubāḥathāt Wafd Zanjibār fī al-Qāhirah wa-Daf‘ ʿArabī lil-Iḥtifālāt ʿīd

Istiqlāl Zanjibār” [Success of the Zanzibar delegation's talks in Cairo and Arab support for Zanzibar's independence celebrations]. October 16, 1963. https://gpa.eastview.com/crl/mena/newspapers/jumh19631016-01.1.4.

Al-Jumhūriyyah. “Raʾīs Wuzarāʾ Yajtamiʿ bi-Najīb Ḥashād” [Prime Minister meets Najib

Hashad]. October 15, 1963. https://gpa.eastview.com/crl/mena/newspapers/jumh19631015-01.1.4.

Soviet

Pravda. "Kopotko" [Briefly]. October 21, 1962. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/69538668.

Pravda. “Predotvratit' ugrozu vmeshatel'stva v dela Zanzibara!” [Prevent the threat of intervention in Zanzibar’s affairs!]. January 27, 1964. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21445282.

Pravda. “Prezidentu Narodnoy Respubliki Zanzibara i Pemby” [To the President of the People's

Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba]. January 19, 1964. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21444620.

Pravda. “Zanzibar v éti dni” [Zanzibar in these days]. April 28, 1964. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21445452.

Zanzibari

(Michael Lofchie collection of Zanzibar Publications at UCLA Library Special Collections)

Afrika Kwetu. “Amerika inapeleka malori kusaidia majeshi ya Umoja wa Mataifa huko Kongo” [America sends trucks to assist United Nations forces in the Congo]. January 10, 1963.

Afrika Kwetu. “China’s Rebuff to Afro-Asian Efforts Towards Peace.” February 14, 1963.

Afrika Kwetu. “The Meaning of Communist Scholarship.” April 25, 1963.

Afrika Kwetu. “Utaifa wasifiwa na kupondwa na Radio ya Moscow” [Nationalism is praised and condemned by Moscow Radio]. January 18, 1962.

Mwongozi. “Israeli Infiltration.” September 28, 1962.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Aid from the East.” September 6, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Ancient Relations Between Zanzibar and China.” February 9, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Chinese Loan Agreement Ratified.” June 21, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Expulsion of UK and US Diplomats.” February 23, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “G.D.R. to give medical aid.” July 5, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Govt. Take Over All Land.” March 15, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Great Task Ahead of Rebuilding Zanzibar.” March 1, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Minister Opens G.D.R. Friendship House.” September 13, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Minister Refutes Bonn Statement.” March 1, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Nationalist Banned.” June 28, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Sick, Old and Unemployed Will Be Helped.” March 8, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “The Western Response to Mr. Khrushchev.” February 9, 1964.

The Zanzibar Voice. “Zanzibar And [sic] G.D.R. Sign Trade Pact.” September 27, 1964.

Zanews. “Afro-Asian Press Criticises India for Refusing to Negotiate on Sino-Indian Border

Conflict.” November 17, 1962.

Zanews. “China Gives Aid to Algeria.” August 27, 1962.

Zanews. “Chinese Public Health Exhibition Opens in Conakry.” June 8, 1962.

Zanews. “Congo: Two Years After.” July 18, 1962.

Tanzanian

The Nationalist. “China Impressed Me.” February 26, 1964.

The Nationalist. “Israel is Aggressor.” June 22, 1967.

The Nationalist. “Lessons of the Middle East War.” June 16, 1967.

The Nationalist. “Tanzania Breaks Diplomatic Ties with Britain.” December 16, 1965.

The Nationalist. “Tanzania Decides on 2 [sic] Germanys.” February 13, 1964.

The Nationalist. “Tanzania has More to Learn from China.” February 25, 1965.

The Nationalist. “Tanzanian Envoy to U.S. Back.” February 23, 1964.

The Nationalist. “Tanzanian Praises Nasser’s Leadership.” July 7, 1967.

The Nationalist. “Union’s Enemies.” June 19, 1964.

The Nationalist. “Were We Wrong?” June 26, 1964.

Other Primary Sources

Aleksandrovich, Tokarev, Shubin Vladimirovich, and Grishina Vladimirovna, eds. V Egipte i na

Zanzibare (1960–1966 gg.): Memuary sovetskikh voennykh perevodchikov [In Egypt and Zanzibar (1960–1966): memoirs of Soviet military interpreters]. Institut Afriki RAN, 2011. https://militera.lib.ru/memo/0/pdf/russian/sb_egypt-zanzibar.pdf.

Babu, Abdulrahman M.. Babu: I Saw the Future and It Works. Edited by Haroub Othman. E&D Limited, 2001.

Babu, Abdulrahman M. “The 1964 Revolution: Lumpen or Vanguard?” In Zanzibar Under

Colonial Rule, edited by Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson. James Currey, 1991.

Burns, John Howard. Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy. May 1, 1995, Foreign Affairs Oral

History Project. The Association for Diplomatic Studies, 1998.

Carlucci, Frank Charles. Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy. April 1, 1997. Foreign Affairs

Oral History Project. The Association for Diplomatic Studies, 2000.

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@mastersthesis{skaggs2025china,
  author = {Skaggs, Clay},
  title  = {China's Fight for Tanzania: A Chinese Cold War Victory in East Africa, 1959--1965},
  school = {Yale University},
  year   = {2025},
  type   = {Senior thesis},
  note   = {Advised by Valerie Hansen},
  url    = {https://www.clayskaggs.com/blog/chinas-fight-for-tanzania}
}